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COMPARAT IVE PROBAB IL I T I E S Jason Konek
On the Bayesian view, belief is not just a binary, on-off matter. Bayesians
model agents not as simply categorically believing or disbelieving propo-
sitions, but rather as having degrees of confidence, or degrees of belief, or
credences in those propositions. Rather than flat out believing that your
Kimchi Jjigae will turn out splendidly, you might, for example, be 0.7
confident that it will turn out splendidly. Or you might have less precise
opinions on the matter. You might be more confident than not that it will
turn out splendidly. You might be at least 0.6 confident and at most 0.9
confident that it will turn out splendidly. You might have any number of
more or less informative opinions, but nevertheless fall short of having a
precise credence on the matter. In that case, we say that your credences are
imprecise.
Credences, whether precise or imprecise, play a number of important
theoretical roles according to Bayesians. For example, a rational agent’s
credences determine expectations of measurable quantities—quantities like
the size of the deficit 10 years hence, or the utility of an outcome—which
capture her best estimates of those quantities. Those best estimates, in turn,
typically rationalise or make sense of her evaluative attitudes and choice
behaviour.
Suppose that you are considering donating to charity. You have cre-
dences regarding the cost of bulk food, shipping, and other matters
relevant for estimating how good different donation options are. Your
credences, let’s imagine, determine a higher expected utility for giving
cash directly to the poor than for investing in infrastructure development.
These expected utilities, on the Bayesian view, capture your best estimates
of how much good each option would produce. And these best estimates,
in turn, rationalise or make sense of your evaluative attitudes—your opin-
ion that direct-giving is the better action, perhaps. Evaluative attitudes,
in turn, rationalise choice behaviour. In the case at hand, your evaluative
attitudes rationalise your choice to give cash directly to the poor rather
than invest in infrastructure development.
According to many Bayesians, e.g., Koopman (1940a, 1940b), Good (1950),
de Finetti (1951), Savage (1954), and Joyce (2010), certain types of doxastic
attitudes—opinions of the form “X is at least as likely as Y,” known as
comparative beliefs—play an especially important role in explicating the
concept of credence. These explications typically involve an important
bit of mathematics known as a representation theorem. The aim of this
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chapter is straightforward, but fundamental. We will explore three very
different approaches to explicating credence using comparative beliefs
and representation theorems. Along the way, we will introduce a brand
new account of credence: epistemic interpretivism. We will also evaluate
how these respective accounts stand up to the criticisms of Hájek (2009),
Meacham and Weisberg (2011), and Titelbaum (2015).
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1 outlines the main
interpretations of comparative probability orderings, which mirror the main
interpretations of quantitative probability functions. Section 2 homes in on
one interpretation of comparative probability in particular: the subjec-
tivist interpretation. Then it briefly surveys some important representation
theorems from Kraft, Pratt, and Seidenberg (1959), Scott (1964), Suppes
and Zanotti (1976), and Alon and Lehrer (2014). Section 3 outlines three
different “comparativist” accounts of credence: the measurement-theoretic,
decision-theoretic, and epistemic interpretivist accounts. Comparativist ac-
counts explain what it is to have one credal state or another in terms of
subjective comparative probability relations (or comparative belief rela-
tions) and representation theorems. Epistemic interpretivism is an entirely
new account of credence. So we spend a bit of time developing it. Section 4
examines criticisms of comparativist accounts by Hájek (2009), Meacham
and Weisberg (2011), and Titelbaum (2015). Finally, Section 5, Section 6,
and Section 7 explore the extent to which our three different approaches
can withstand these criticisms. We will pay special attention to the question
of whether they vindicate probabilism: the thesis that rational credences
satisfy the probability axioms.
1 main interpretations of comparative probability
Probabilities seem to pop up all over the place. They feature in the re-
spective explanations of all sorts of different phenomena. They help to
explain, for example, singular events, such as the outcomes of particular
experiments, particular one-off historical events, and the like. Consider
some examples:
(1a) Why did the die land with a blue face up?
(1b) It has 1 blue faces and 1 red face. And it’s fair. So it had a 5/6
probability of coming up blue.
(2a) Why did Rose get lung cancer?
(2b) She smoked for 30 years. And the probability of getting lung cancer
if you smoke for so long is really high.
The high probability (= 5/6) of this particular die coming up blue on
this particular toss helps to explain why it in fact came up blue. And the
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high probability of this particular person—Rose—getting lung cancer (as
a result of her 30 years of smoking) helps to explain why she in fact got
lung cancer. Probabilities also help to explain why we ought to have high
or low confidence in certain hypotheses. Consider:
(3a) Why should we think that Quantum Electrodynamics is true?
(3b) It’s the best confirmed physical theory ever. It’s extremely probable
given the current evidence.
(4a) Why should we think that Jones stole the paintings?
(4b) Given his acrimonious history with the art museum’s curator, the
eyewitness testimony, and the DNA evidence, it’s quite probable that
Jones is guilty.
The extremely high probability of Quantum Electrodynamics given the
current evidence at least partially explains why we ought to think that it is
true. Likewise, the high probability that Jones stole the paintings given the
eyewitness testimony, the DNA evidence, etc., at least partially explains
why we ought to think that he is guilty. Finally, probabilities explain and
rationalise our behaviour. For example:
(5a) Why did you bet Aadil £100 that Manchester City would win their
match against Newcastle?
(5b) Have you seen Newcastle lately? They’re a joke. It’s extremely prob-
able that Manchester City will win.
(6a) Why did you go to Better Food Company rather than Sainsbury’s?
(6b) I wanted fresh herbs, and it’s more probable that the Better Food
Company will have them.
The fact that it is extremely probable, in your view, that Manchester City
will win the match helps to explain why you took the bet. It also helps
to rationalise or make sense of your decision. And the fact that it’s more
probable, in your view, that the Better Food Company will have fresh
herbs than Sainsbury’s helps to explain and rationalise your choice to go
to the Better Food Company.
So, probabilities seem to do quite a lot of explanatory work. But no
single thing is shouldering the whole explanatory load in (1)–(6). Different
kinds of probability do the explaining in different examples. In (1)–(2), it is
the physical probability or chance of the singular event in question that helps
to explain why the event actually occurs. (See Hájek, 2009, Gillies, 2000,
and Hitchcock, 2012, for discussion of different theories of chance.) In
(3)–(4), it is the logical probability or degree of confirmation of the hypothesis
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in question (conditional on the current evidence) that helps to explain
why we ought to accept it. (See Earman, 1992, Hájek and Joyce, 2008, and
Paris, 2011, for discussion of Bayesian confirmation theory and some of its
issues.) Finally, in (5)–(6), it is the subjective probability, or degree of belief, or
credence, of the agent in question that helps to explain and rationalise her
choice.
Formally, a probability function is just a particular type of real-valued
function. Let Ω be a universal set, which we can think of as the set of
“possible worlds” or “basic possibilities.” And let F be a Boolean algebra
of subsets of Ω, which we can think of as a set of “propositions.” More
carefully, we can think of each X ∈ F as the proposition that is true at
each world w ∈ F , and false at each w∗ 6∈ F . A Boolean algebra F of
subsets of Ω has three important properties: (i) F contains Ω (i.e., Ω ∈ F );
(ii) F is closed under complementation (i.e., if X ∈ F , then Ω− X ∈ F );
and (iii) F is closed under unions (i.e., if X,Y ∈ F , then X ∪ Y ∈ F ). A
real-valued function p : F → R is a probability function if and only if it
satisfies the laws of (finitely additive) probability.
1. Normalization. p(Ω) = 1.
2. Nonnegativity. p(X) ≥ p(∅).
3. Finite Additivity. If X ∩Y = ∅, then p(X ∪Y) = p(X) + p(Y).
Axiom 1 says that p must assign probability 1 to the tautologous proposi-
tion Ω. Axiom 2 says that p must assign at least as high a probability to
every proposition X as it does to the contradiction ∅. Axiom 3 says that
the probability that p invests in a disjunction of incompatible propositions
X and Y must be the sum of the probabilities that it invests in X and Y,
respectively.
The three main interpretations of probability—physical probability, or
chance; logical probability, or degree of confirmation; and subjective probabil-
ity, or degree of belief, or credence—correspond to the three main types of
phenomena that we use probability functions to model. For example, ac-
cording to propensity theories of chance, chance functions measure how
strongly a causal system is disposed to produce one outcome or other on
a particular occasion. Chance functions, on this view, are just probability
functions that are used to model one type of physical system (causal
systems) as having one type of gradable property (causal dispositions of
varying strengths). Likewise, logical probability functions measure how
strongly a body of evidence E supports or confirms a given hypothesis H.
Logical probability functions are just probability functions that are used to
model another type of target system (systems of propositions describing
data and hypotheses) as having another type of gradable property (as
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having hypotheses which are supported to varying degrees by data propo-
sitions). Finally, subjective probability functions, or credence functions,
measure (roughly) how confident an agent with some range of doxastic
attitudes can be said to be of various propositions. Subjective probability
functions are just probability functions that are used to model yet another
type of system (an agent’s doxastic attitudes) as having yet another type
of gradable property (as either constituting or licensing varying degrees
of confidence).
Of course, sorting out the precise relationship between these various
models—probability functions—and their respective target systems is a
delicate task. The “interpretations” above provide only rough, first-pass
descriptions of that relationship. Part of this chapter’s goal is to explore
the relationship between subjective probability functions, in particular, and
the underlying system of doxastic attitudes that they model.
Just as there are a few main interpretations of quantitative probability
functions, corresponding to the main types of phenomena that we use
those probability functions to model, so too are there a few main interpre-
tations of “comparative probability orderings.” Formally, a comparative
probability ordering is just particular type of relation  on a Boolean alge-
bra F of subsets of Ω. On each of the three main interpretations, “X  Y”
means roughly that X is at least as probable as Y. (What exactly this amounts
to, however, will vary from interpretation to interpretation.) Traditionally,
a relation  on F is said to be a comparative probability ordering if and
only if it satisfies de Finetti’s (1964, pp. 100–101) axioms of comparative
probability.
1. Nontriviality. Ω  ∅ and ∅ 6 Ω.
2. Nonnegativity. X  ∅.
3. Transitivity. If X  Y and Y  Z, then X  Z.
4. Totality. X  Y or Y  X.
5. Quasi-Additivity. If X ∩ Z = Y ∩ Z = ∅, then X  Y if and only if
X ∪ Z  Y ∪ Z.
Axiom 1 says that the tautology Ω is strictly more probable than the
contradiction ∅. Axiom 2 says that every proposition X is at least as
probable as the contradiction ∅. Axioms 3 and 4 guarantee that  is a
total preorder (i.e., reflexive, transitive, and total). Finally, axiom 5 says
that disjoining X and Y with some incompatible Z does nothing to alter
their comparative probability; so X is at least as probable as Y if and only
if the disjunction of X and Z is at least as probable as the disjunction of Y
and Z.
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The three main interpretations of comparative probability correspond to
the three main types of phenomena that we use comparative probability
orderings to model. Physical comparative probability orderings, or chance or-
derings—on one theory of chance anyway, viz., propensity theory—model
causal systems. In particular, they model causal systems C as being more or
less strongly disposed to produce one outcome or another on a particular
occasion:
X  Y
iff
C is at least as strongly disposed to produce an outcome w ∈ X
and thereby make X true as it is to produce an outcome w∗ ∈ Y
and thereby make Y true.
Logical comparative probability orderings model a rather different type of
target system: systems of propositions describing data and hypotheses. In
particular, they model certain data D as supporting or confirming certain
hypotheses H more than other data D∗ support other hypotheses H∗:
〈H,D〉  〈H∗,D∗〉
iff
D supports or confirms H at least as much as D∗ supports or
confirms H∗.
Finally, subjective comparative probability orderings model yet another type
of target system: an agent’s doxastic attitudes. In particular, they model
agent A as being more or less confident that one proposition or another is
true:
X  Y
iff
A is at least as confident that X is true as she is that Y is true.
Of course, the three main interpretations of comparative probability are
really families of interpretations. All three types of comparative probability
orderings come in different flavours. For example, behaviorists like de
Finetti (1931, 1964) and Savage (1954) treat subjective comparative prob-
ability orderings as particular types of preference orderings. To be more
confident that X is true than Y is, roughly speaking, to prefer a dollar
bet on X to a dollar bet on Y. They subscribe to what Jeffrey calls the
thesis of the primacy of practical reason, which says that between belief and
preference, “it is preference that is real and primary” (Jeffrey, 1987, p. 590).
Hence, “belief states that correspond to identical preference rankings of
propositions are in fact one and the same” (Jeffrey, 1965/1983, p. 138).
Jeffrey (1965, 2002) and Joyce (1999), in contrast, do not subscribe to this
thesis. On their view, being more confident that X is true than Y involves
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making a peculiarly doxastic judgment. Such doxastic judgments partially
explain and rationalise our preferences. But they do not even supervene
on preferences, let alone reduce to them. (Two agents, for example, could
both be in a state of nirvana on this view, and so be indifferent between
every prospect and the status quo, but nevertheless make different compar-
ative probability judgments.) And the laws governing rational subjective
comparative probability judgments, on this account, are not simply special
cases of the laws governing rational preference. Rather, they derive from
peculiarly epistemic considerations, e.g., considerations of accuracy.
To have a general way of talking about comparative beliefs, without
assuming that they satisfy de Finetti’s axioms, let’s introduce some termi-
nology. Call any relation  on an algebra F of subsets of Ω that is used to
model an agent’s comparative beliefs a comparative belief relation. And call
〈Ω,F ,〉 a comparative belief structure. Comparative belief relations may
or may not be comparative probability orderings. That is, they may or may
not satisfy de Finetti’s axioms of comparative probability.
Why the hubbub about comparative belief? Why think that comparative
belief relations have a particularly important role to play in modeling
rational agents’ doxastic states? What are they especially suited to do that
precise, real-valued credence functions are not?
There are a number of common answers to these questions. The first is
that comparative belief relations provide a more psychologically realistic
model of agents’ doxastic attitudes than precise, real-valued credence
functions. Often I simply lack an opinion about which of two propositions
is more plausible. I am not more confident that copper will be greater than
£2/lb in 2025 (call this proposition C) than I am that nickel will be greater
than £3/lb in 2025 (call this proposition N). Neither am I less confident in
C than N, nor equally confident. I simply lack an opinion on the matter. We
can model this using comparative belief relations. Just choose a relation 
that does not rank C and N:
C 6 N and N 6 C.
The incompleteness in  reflects my lack of opinionation. Precise credence
functions, on the other hand, do not allow for this sort of lack of opiniona-
tion. Any agent with precise credences for C and N takes a stand on their
comparative plausibility. She is either more confident in C than N, less
confident in C than N, or equally confident in the two.1
The second answer is evidentialist. Not only do real agents in fact have
sparse and incomplete opinions, but they ought to have such opinions. If
your evidence is incomplete and unspecific, then your comparative beliefs
1 See Suppes (1994, p. 19), Kyburg and Pittarelli (1996, p. 325), Kaplan (2010, p. 47), and
Joyce (2010, p. 283) for similar remarks.
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(and your other qualitative and comparative opinions) should be corre-
spondingly incomplete to reflect the unspecific nature of that evidence.
This is the response that is most justified, or warranted, or appropriate in
light of such evidence. Again, we can capture this sort of lack of opinion-
ation using comparative belief relations, but not using precise credence
functions. Having precise credences requires having total or complete
comparative beliefs (as well as total conditional comparative beliefs, total
preferences, and so on).2
The third answer is information-theoretic. Proponents of maximum en-
tropy methods, for example, argue that you ought to have the least infor-
mative doxastic state consistent with your evidence. And according to any
plausible informativeness or entropy measure for comparative beliefs, any
incomplete comparative belief relation will be less informative than any
extension of it.3 As a result, minimizing informativeness will often require
adopting incomplete comparative beliefs. Precise credences, however, do
not allow for incomplete comparative beliefs. As Joyce puts it, adopting
precise credences, in many evidential circumstances, “amounts to pretend-
ing that you have lots and lots of information that you simply don’t have”
(Joyce, 2010, p. 284).
The final common answer is that comparative belief is more explanato-
rily fundamental than precise credence. Comparative beliefs figure into
the best explanation of what precise credences are, but not vice versa. It is
worthwhile, then, exploring the various accounts of credence that aim to
furnish such an explanation. We will turn our attention to them shortly.
Each of these accounts, however, makes use of an important bit of mathe-
matics known as a representation theorem. So our first task is to get familiar
with the nuts and bolts of representation theorems.
2 representation theorems
Suppose that Monty Hall invites you to choose one of three doors: either
door a, b, or c. Behind one of these doors: a car. Behind the other two: a
goat. You are more confident that the car is behind a than b, let’s imagine.
You are also more confident that it’s behind b than c. But that is all. You
do not take a stand, for example, on whether it’s more likely to be behind
either b or c than a, or vice versa. You abstain from judgment on all other
matters.
Let wa be the world in which the car is behind door a, wb be the world
in which the car is behind door b, and wc be the world in which the car is
2 See Joyce (2005, p. 171) for similar remarks.
3 See Abellan and Moral (2000, 2003) for measures of entropy for imprecise probability
models which might also serve as measures of entropy for comparative belief relations.
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behind door c. Then we can represent you as having comparative beliefs
about propositions in the following Boolean algebra:
F =


{wa,wb,wc}
{wa,wb} , {wa,wc} , {wb,wc} ,
{wa} , {wb} , {wc} ,
∅


.
And we can represent those fragmentary comparative beliefs as follows:
{wa,wb,wc} ≻ {wa} ≻ {wb} ≻ {wc} ≻ ∅,
where X ≻ Y is shorthand for X  Y and X 6 Y.4
Your comparative belief relation  is not a comparative probability
ordering, i.e.,  does not satisfy de Finetti’s axioms of comparative proba-
bility. Relation  violates Quasi-Additivity, for example, as well as totality.
You are, after all, more confident that the car is behind a than b:
{wa} ≻ {wb} .
So de Finetti’s Quasi-Additivity axiom demands that you also be more
confident that it is behind a or c than you are that it is behind b or c. But
you abstain from judgment on the matter:
{wa,wc} 6 {wb,wc} and {wa,wc} 6 {wb,wc} .
A few back-of-the-envelope calculations suffice to show that de Finetti’s
axioms are necessary for probabilistic representability. Following Savage
(1954), we say that:
p fully agrees with 
iff
X  Y ⇔ p(X) ≥ p(Y).
We say that  is (fully) probabilistically representable iff there is a probability
function p that fully agrees with . Since your comparative belief relation
 does not satisfy de Finetti’s axioms, in our little example, it is not
probabilistically representable.
4 This shorthand is inadequate. You may well think X  Y and X 6 Y without thinking
X ≻ Y. Imagine for example that you recently learned that Y entails X. So you think that
X is at least as likely as Y, i.e., X  Y. But you have no idea whether the entailment goes
both ways. So you withhold judgment about whether Y is at least as likely as X, i.e., X 6 Y.
For exactly the same reason you withhold judgment about whether X is strictly more
likely than Y, i.e., X 6≻ Y. We would do better, then, to represent your doxastic state with a
pair of relations 〈≻,〉. But historically one or the other has been taken as primitive. For
ease of exposition, we follow de Finetti (1951), Savage (1954), and Krantz, Luce, Suppes,
and Tversky (1971), who take  as primitive.
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De Finetti (1951) famously conjectured that his axioms encode not only
necessary conditions for probabilistically representability, but sufficient
conditions as well. The question: was de Finetti right?
Let 〈Ω,F ,〉 be an agent’s comparative belief structure. (For now,
assume that F is finite.) Probability functions that fully agree with  show
that we can think of that structure 〈Ω,F ,〉 numerically, so to speak. We
can map the propositions X in F to real-valued proxies p(X). And we
can do so in such a way that one proxy p(X) is larger than another p(Y)
exactly when our agent is more confident in X than Y. So the familiar
“greater than or equal to” relation ≥ on the real numbers R is a mirror
image of our agent’s comparative belief relation  on F .
Kraft et al. (1959) show that de Finetti’s conjecture is false. Though de
Finetti’s axioms are necessary for probabilistic representability, they are not
sufficient. To establish this, Kraft et al. construct a clever counterexample
involving a comparative belief relation  over the Boolean algebra G of all
subsets of Ω = {wa,wb,wc,wd,we}. Their relation  satisfies de Finetti’s
axioms of comparative probability, and also the following inequalities:
{wd} ≻ {wa,wc} , (1)
{wb,wc} ≻ {wa,wd} , (2)
{wa,we} ≻ {wc,wd} . (3)
As a result, any probability function p that fully agrees with  satisfies the
corresponding inequalities (to simplify notation, we let p({w}) = p(w)):
p(wd) > p(wa) + p(wc), (4)
p(wb) + p(wc) > p(wa) + p(wd), (5)
p(wa) + p(we) > p(wc) + p(wd). (6)
But any p that satisfies (4)–(6) also satisfies (7) (simply sum the inequali-
ties).
p(wb) + p(we) > p(wa) + p(wc) + p(wd). (7)
Notice, however, that {wb,we} and {wa,wc,wd} appear nowhere in (1)–(3).
So Transitivity does not constrain how you order them. Neither do any
supersets of {wb,we} or {wa,wc,wd} appear there. So Quasi-Additivity
does not constrain how you order them either. Hence, for all de Finetti’s
axiom say, you can order {wb,we} and {wa,wc,wd} any way you please.
So Kraft et al. make  satisfy (8).
{wb,we}  {wa,wc,wd} . (8)
But if p fully agrees with , then (8) requires:
p(wb) + p(we) ≤ p(wa) + p(wc) + p(wd). (9)
Lines (7) and (9), however, are jointly unsatisfiable. So no probability
function p fully agrees with .
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2.1 Scott’s Theorem
So de Finetti’s conjecture is false. De Finetti’s axioms of comparative prob-
ability are not necessary and sufficient for probabilistic representability.
Luckily, Kraft et al. (1959) and Scott (1964) provide the requisite fix. They
provide stronger axioms that are both necessary and sufficient for prob-
abilistic representability. Scott’s axioms are more straightforward, so we
will focus our attention on them.
Before stating Scott’s theorem, it is worth noting that our formulation
abuses notation a bit. Expressions ‘Xi’ and ‘Yi’ refer both to propositions
in F , as well as their characteristic functions, i.e., functions that take the
value 1 at worlds w where Xi (or Yi) is true (i.e., w ∈ Xi), and take the
value 1 at worlds w′ where Xi is false (i.e., w′ 6∈ Xi). This will turn out to
be a helpful bit of sloppiness.
Scott (1964) proves the following:
Scott’s Theorem. Every comparative belief structure 〈Ω,F ,〉
(with finite F ) has a probability function p : F → R that fully
agrees with  in the sense that
X  Y ⇔ p(X) ≥ p(Y)
if and only if  satisfies the following axioms.
1. Non-triviality. Ω ≻ ∅.
2. Non-negativity. X  ∅.
3. Totality. X  Y or Y  X.
4. Isovalence. If X1 + . . .+ Xn = Y1 + . . .+Yn and Xi  Yi
for all i ≤ n, then Xi  Yi for all i ≤ n as well.
Axiom 4—sometimes called Scott’s axiom, the Isovalence axiom, or the Finite
cancellation axiom—is the one new axiom of the bunch. To see what it
says, note that X1(w) + . . .+ Xn(w) counts the number of truths in the set
{X1, . . . ,Xn} at world w. Ditto for Y1(w) + . . .+Yn(w). So
X1 + . . .+ Xn = Y1 + . . .+Yn
says that the two sets of propositions, {X1, . . . ,Xn} and {Y1, . . . ,Yn}, con-
tain the same number of truths come what may, i.e., in every possible world.
We call such sets of propositions isovalent.
In light of this, the Isovalence axiom says that if {X1, . . . ,Xn} and
{Y1, . . . ,Yn} are isovalent, then you cannot think that the Xis are uniformly
more plausible than the Yis. (“Uniformly more plausible” here means that
you think that Xi is at least as plausible as Yi for all i, and that Xj is strictly
more plausible than Yj for some j.) After all, an equal number of the Xis
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and Yis are guaranteed to be true! So you can only think that the Xis are
at least as plausible as the Yis across the board if you think that they are
equally plausible.
But how exactly does Scott prove his representation theorem? It is worth
walking through the proof strategy informally. This will help interested
readers dig through the mathematical minutia in Scott (1964).
Indeed, it will prove instructive to use Scott’s strategy to establish
something slightly stronger than Scott’s theorem.
Generalised Scott’s Theorem (GST). For any comparative be-
lief structure 〈Ω,F ,〉 with finite F and a comparative belief
relation  that satisfies
1. Non-triviality. Ω ≻ ∅,
2. Non-negativity. X  ∅,
the following two conditions are equivalent.
3. Isovalence. If X1 + . . .+ Xn = Y1 + . . .+Yn and Xi  Yi
for all i ≤ n, then Xi  Yi for all i ≤ n as well.
4. Strong representability. there exists a probability func-
tion p : F → R that strongly agrees with  in the sense
that
(i) X  Y ⇒ p(X) ≥ p(Y),
(ii) X ≻ Y ⇒ p(X) > p(Y).
Scott’s theorem, as we shall see at the end of Section 2, follows fairly
straightforwardly from GST. We prove the GST in the appendix.
The key insight required for proving GST is this. In the presence of
Non-triviality and Non-negativity, strong representability boils down to
sorting almost desirable gambles from undesirable gambles.5 On top of this,
Scott (1964) shows that sorting almost desirable from undesirable gambles
is equivalent to satisfying Isovalence.6 Figure 1 summarizes the situation.
Given Non-triviality and Non-negativity
Strong rep. ⇔ Sort gambles ⇔ Isovalence
Figure 1: Logical relations between properties of 
5 For an accessible introduction to desirable gambles, see Walley (2000). See Quaeghebeur
(2014) for more detail.
6 More carefully, Scott (1964) shows that for any comparative belief relation  that satisfies
Non-triviality and Non-negativity, satisfying Isovalence is sufficient for sorting almost
desirable from undesirable gambles. Showing that it is necessary is straightforward. See
the appendix for proof.
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Gambles are measurable quantities G : Ω → R. Say that a gamble G is
almost desirable relative to  iff it is a non-negative linear combination of
almost desirable components:
(X1 −Y1), . . . , (Xn −Yn).
And say that each component Xi − Yi is almost desirable iff Xi  Yi.
Gamble G is a non-negative linear combination of (X1−Y1), . . . , (Xn −Yn)
just in case:
G = ∑
i
λi(Xi −Yi)
for some λ1, . . . ,λn ≥ 0.
We call components Xi − Yi almost-desirable if Xi  Yi because any
probability function p that strongly agrees with  determines a non-
negative expected value for Xi −Yi:
Xi  Yi ⇒ p(Xi) ≥ p(Yi)
⇔ Ep[Xi] ≥ Ep[Xi]
⇔ Ep[Xi −Yi] ≥ 0.
So if we interpret those values as payoffs in utility, then p expects Xi −Yi
to be at least as good as the status quo (i.e., its expected utility is non-
negative).
Likewise, we call G almost desirable if it is a non-negative linear combi-
nation of almost-desirable components because any probability function p
that strongly agrees with  determines a non-negative expected value for
G:
Xi  Yi for all i ⇒ Ep[Xi −Yi] ≥ 0 for all i
⇒ ∑
i
λiEp[Xi −Yi] ≥ 0
⇔ Ep
[
∑
i
λi(Xi −Yi)
]
≥ 0
⇔ Ep[G] ≥ 0.
Similar remarks apply to undesirable gambles. We call a gamble G∗ undesir-
able relative to  iff it is a convex combination of undesirable components
(X∗1 −Y∗1 ), . . . , (X∗n −Y∗n ),
so that
G∗ = ∑
i
λ∗i (X
∗
i −Y∗i ).
for some λ∗1 , . . . ,λ
∗
n ≥ 0 with ∑i λ∗i = 1. A component X∗i − Y∗i is unde-
sirable iff X∗i ≺ Y∗i . The reason is the same as before. Any probability
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function that strongly agrees with  determines a negative expected value
for undesirable components, as well as convex combinations of undesirable
components.
Now say that  sorts almost desirable gambles from undesirable ones iff the
two sets of gambles are disjoint. That is, if
A =
{G | G is almost desirable rel. to }
and
U =
{G∗ | G∗ is undesirable rel. to } ,
then  sorts almost desirable gambles from undesirable ones iff
A ∩U = ∅.
If  fails to sort gambles in this way, then some gamble is both almost
desirable and undesirable, i.e., G = G∗ for some almost desirable gamble
G and some undesirable gamble G∗. And if that is the case, then there is no
probability that strongly agrees with it. (Moreover, since full probabilistic
representability entails strong representability, there is no probability
function that fully agrees with it either.) If it were strongly representable,
then we would have both
Ep[G] = Ep[G∗]
and
Ep[G∗] < 0 ≤ Ep[G]
for some probability function p.
This shows that sorting almost desirable from undesirable gambles is
necessary for strong agreement with a probability function, which is itself
necessary for full agreement with a probability function, i.e., probabilistic
representability. Scott’s insight, though, is that it is also sufficient, in the
presence of Non-triviality and Non-negativity. Given that  satisfies Non-
triviality and Non-negativity, it sorts almost desirable from undesirable
gambles if and only if it strongly agrees with a probability function. What’s
more, if  is total as well, then strong agreement is equivalent to full
agreement. So non-trivial, non-negative, total comparative belief relations
sort almost desirable from undesirable gambles if and only if they are
probabilistically representable. See Figure 2.
To prove this, Scott uses what is known as a hyperplane separation theorem.
The hyperplane separation theorem guarantees that for any two closed,
convex, disjoint sets, there is a hyperplane that strictly separates them
(Kuhn & Tucker, 1956, p. 50). Now note that A is the closed, convex
polyhedral cone generated by the set
{
X−Y | X  Y}. Likewise, U is the
convex hull of
{
Y− X | X ≻ Y}—a closed and convex set. And if  sorts
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Given Non-triviality, Non-negativity and Totality
Strong rep. ⇔ Full prob. rep.
m
Sort gambles ⇔ Isovalence
Figure 2: Logical relations between properties of 
−1 0 1−1
0
1
A
U
Figure 3: Hyperplane strictly separating A and U
almost desirable from undesirable gambles, then they are also disjoint. So
there is a hyperplane that strictly separates A and U (see Figure 3).
This hyperplane determines (in effect) an expectation operator E. Gam-
bles G on one side of the hyperplane get positive expected values according
to E. Gambles on the other side get negatives ones. Precisely how high or
low E[G] happens to be is determined by G’s distance from the hyperplane.
The resulting expectation operator E assigns a non-negative value to
every almost desirable gamble G in A, and a negative value to every
undesirable gamble G∗ in U:
E[G] ≥ 0 for all G ∈ A,
E[G∗] < 0 for all G∗ ∈ U.
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And from this expectation operator, E, it is fairly straightforward to extract
a probability function p that strongly agrees with . Just let p(X) = E[X]
for all X ∈ F .7 Then we have:
Xi  Yi ⇒ E[Xi −Yi] ≥ 0
⇔ E[Xi] ≥ E[Yi]
⇔ p(Xi) ≥ p(Yi).
We also have:
X∗i ≺ Y∗i ⇒ E[X∗i −Y∗i ] < 0
⇔ E[X∗i ] < E[Y∗i ]
⇔ p(X∗i ) < p(Y∗i ).
The upshot: sorting almost desirable from undesirable gambles is both
necessary and sufficient for strong agreement with a probability function
(in the presence of Non-triviality and Non-negativity).
Now for the kicker: a comparative belief relation —whether or not it
satisfies Non-triviality and Non-negativity—sorts almost desirable from
undesirable gambles (in the sense that A ∩ U = ∅) if and only if it
satisfies Isovalence.8 Hence non-trivial and non-negative  are strongly
representable if and only if they satisfy Isovalence. What’s more, as we
mentioned above, for total comparative belief relations it’s easy to see
that strong agreement with a probability function is equivalent to full
agreement. So non-trivial, non-negative, total  are fully probabilistically
representable if and only if they satisfy Isovalence. This is the main thrust
of Scott’s theorem.
2.2 Varieties of Representability
There are, of course, other types of representability besides just strong and
full probabilistic representability. For example, a probability function p
strongly agrees with  just in case it satisfies two conditions:
X  Y ⇒ p(X) ≥ p(Y),
X ≻ Y ⇒ p(X) > p(Y).
7 More methodically, the hyperplane separation theorem gives a strictly separating linear
functional, φ. But given that  satisfies Non-triviality and Non-negativity, A and U have
a certain structure, which guarantees that we can normalise φ to arrive at an expectation
operator E. For example, Non-triviality ensures that ∅ − Ω ∈ Y . Hence φ(Ω) > 0.
Normalising then gives us E[Ω] = 1. Similarly, Non-negativity ensures that X −∅ ∈ X .
Hence φ(X) ≥ 0, and in turn E[X] ≥ 0.
8 See Scott (1964, pp. 235–6) for the proof of sufficiency. We present a simplified version of
both necessity and sufficiency in the appendix.
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We can pick apart these two conditions to arrive at two weaker notions of
representability. Say that
p almost agrees with 
iff
X  Y ⇒ p(X) ≥ p(Y),
and also that
p partially agrees with 
iff
X ≻ Y ⇒ p(X) > p(Y).
A comparative belief relation  is almost representable if there is a proba-
bility function p that almost agrees with . Likewise,  is partially rep-
resentable if there is a probability function p that partially agrees with
.
Kraft et al. (1959) show that  is almost representable if and only if it
satisfies the Almost-Cancellation axiom.
Almost-Cancellation. If
X1 + . . .+ Xn < Y1 + . . .+Yn
and Xi  Yi for all i 6= j, then Xj 6 Yj.
Similarly, Adams (1965) and Fishburn (1969) show that  is partially
representable if and only if it satisfies the Partial-Cancellation axiom.
Partial-Cancellation. If X1 + . . .+ Xn ≤ Y1 + . . .+ Yn and
Xi ≻ Yi for all i 6= j, then Xj 6≻ Yj.
It does not, to be clear, follow from these two results that  is strongly
representable if and only if  satisfies both the Almost and Partial-
Cancellation axioms. Satisfying Almost and Partial-Cancellation would
simply guarantee that (i) some probability function p almost agrees with
, and (ii) some possibly distinct probability function q partially agrees
with . But strong representability requires that a single probability func-
tion do both types of agreeing. It is an open question what exactly is
required for strong representability. (Of course, GST identifies necessary
and sufficient conditions for strong representability given Non-triviality and
Non-negativity. But clearly neither of those conditions is itself necessary
for strong representability.)
Almost, partial, and strong representability all place negative demands
on your comparative beliefs. They require you to avoid certain sets of
comparative beliefs. Say that
p endorses  iff p(X) ≥ p(Y)⇒ X  Y.
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For your comparative belief relation  to be almost representable, you
must avoid having weak comparative beliefs that no probability function
whatsoever endorses. Likewise, for  to be partially representable, you
must avoid having strict comparative beliefs that no probability function
endorses. For  to be strongly representable, you must avoid both.
Full probabilistic representability is stronger. It makes positive demands
as well as negative demands on your comparative beliefs. Full probabilistic
representability requires your comparative beliefs to be sufficiently rich
and specific that some probability function endorses exactly those compar-
ative beliefs. So not only must you avoid comparative beliefs that are not
endorsed by any probability function, but you must positively go in for all
of the comparative beliefs endorsed by some probability function.
Imprecise representability, or IP-representability, strikes a balance between
these previous types. Like strong representability, IP-representability
places negative demands on your comparative beliefs. It requires you to
avoid comparative beliefs that no probability function endorses. But like
full probabilistic representability, it also makes positive demands on your
comparative beliefs. It does not go so far as to demand that you go in for
all of the comparative beliefs endorsed by some probability function. But
it does say that you must already be more confident in X than Y if every
probability function that endorses your other comparative beliefs endorses
X ≻ Y as well. In this way, it requires you to draw out the “probabilistic
consequences” of your other comparative beliefs.
Formally, a comparative belief relation  is imprecisely representable if
and only if there is a set of probability functions P that fully agrees with
it:
P fully agrees with 
iff
X  Y ⇔ p(X) ≥ p(Y) for all p ∈ P .
Rios Insua (1992) and Alon and Lehrer (2014) show that  is IP-
representable if and only if it satisfies Reflexivity, Non-negativity, Non-
triviality, and the Generalised Finite-Cancellation axiom.
Generalised Finite-Cancellation axiom. If
X1 + . . .+ Xn + A+ . . .+ A︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
= Y1 + . . .+Yn + B+ . . .+ B︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
and Xi  Yi for all i ≤ n, then A  B.
IP-representability is clearly stronger than strong representability.
IP-representability implies strong-representability. But a strongly repre-
sentable comparative belief relation  might fail to satisfy Reflexivity,
Non-negativity, and Non-triviality. No IP-representable  will do so,
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Figure 4: Logical relations between different types of representability
however. So strong-representability does not imply IP-representability.
Moreover, Harrison-Trainor, Holliday, and Icard (2016) show that even for
non-trivial, non-negative, and reflexive , IP-representability is stronger
than strong representability.
To wrap up, let’s taxonimise these various types of representability
according to their logical strength: see Figure 4.
2.3 Loose Ends: Infinite Algebras, Conditional Comparative Beliefs, Etc.
Scott (1964, p. 247) claims that his theorem extends to comparative belief
structures 〈Ω,F ,〉 with infinite algebras F , by a clever application of the
Hahn-Banach Theorem. The proof however remains unpublished. Suppes
and Zanotti (1976) also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a
comparative belief relation on an infinite algebra to be fully probabilisti-
cally representable. Suppes and Zanotti’s axioms, however, do not directly
constrain comparative beliefs. Rather, they show that  is probabilistically
representable if and only if it is extendable to a comparative estimation rela-
tion over a larger set; a set containing not just propositions—sets of worlds,
or equivalently, functions from worlds to 1 (true) or 0 (false), i.e., indicator
functions—but to real-valued quantities Q : Ω → R more generally.
To get the rough idea, consider a travel agent. She might not have
a precise estimate of how many travelers will go to Hawaii this year.
(Perhaps her evidence is incomplete and ambiguous.) Likewise, she might
not have a precise estimate of how many travelers will go to Acapulco.
Despite this, she might well estimate that more travelers will go to Hawaii
than Acapulco. Or consider the weather. Alayna might not have a precise
estimate of how much rain London will receive in June. She might not
have a precise estimate of how much rain Canterbury will receive in June.
Despite this, she might estimate that London will receive more rain than
Canterbury.
Ditto for stock prices, or the number of MPs that different parties will
lose or gain in the next election, or any other quantity you might care about.
You can have comparative estimates regarding those respective quantities—
i.e., estimate that one quantity Q will have a higher/equal/lower value
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than another quantity Q∗—without having a unique, precise best estimate
for any of them.
Call a relation ∗ on a set F ∗ of real-valued quantities defined on Ω
a comparative estimation relation if it is used to model an agent’s compara-
tive estimates. And call a comparative estimation relation ∗ qualitatively
satisfactory if it satisfies the following (putative) coherence constraints.
1. ∗ is transitive and total.
2. Ω ≻∗ ∅.
3. X ∗ ∅.
4. X ∗ Y iff X+ Z ∗ Y+ Z.
5. If X ≻∗ Y then for all W,Z ∈ F ∗, there’s an n > 0 such that
X+ . . .+ X︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
+W ∗ Y+ . . .+Y︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
+Z.
Suppes and Zanotti (1976) show that a comparative belief relation  on
an algebra F of propositions (indicator functions), whether F is finite
or infinite, is fully probabilistically representable if and only if there is a
comparative estimation relation ∗ on the set F ∗ of non-negative integer-
valued quantities
F ∗ = {Q | Q : Ω → Z≥0} ,
which both (i) extends , and (ii) is qualitatively satisfactory.
This shows that whatever latent structural defect prevents a comparative
belief relation  from being fully probabilistically representable rears its
head explicitly when you extend the relation. If  has this defect, then
when you extend it, so that it encodes not just comparative estimates of
truth-values of propositions, but also comparative estimates of the values
of non-negative integer-valued quantities more generally, what you end up
with—your new, larger comparative estimation relation ∗—will violate
one of Suppes and Zanotti’s putative coherence constraints. And vice versa.
If  does not have this latent defect, then there is some way of extending it
that does not violate those constraints.9
Of course, the representation theorems surveyed here are just the tip
of the iceberg. For example, we said that a comparative belief relation
 is imprecisely representable if and only if there is a set of probability
functions P that fully agrees with it. But we could explore full agreement
(or almost agreement, or partial agreement, or strong agreement) with any
9 Suppes and Zanotti’s axiom 5 is an “Archimedean axiom,” which guarantees (roughly)
that differences in one’s best estimates are not “infinitely small.” For a non-Archimedean
theory of comparative estimation, see Pederson (2014).
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number of imprecise probability models: Dempster-Shafer belief functions,
n-monotone Choquet capacities, coherent lower previsions/expectations,
or coherent lower probabilities (cf. Walley, 1991, 2000; Augustin, Coolen,
de Cooman, and Troffaes, 2014; Troffaes and de Cooman, 2014).
Alternatively, we could focus not on comparative belief relations, but
conditional comparative belief relations. Hájek (2003)—following Rényi
(1955), Jeffreys (1961), de Finetti (1974), and others—argues forcefully
that we should treat precise conditional credence as more fundamental
than precise unconditional credence. Similarly, we might treat conditional
comparative beliefs of the form
A | B  C | D
as more fundamental than unconditional comparative beliefs. A | B  C |D
says that the agent in question is at least as confident in A given B as she
is in C given D. We can then recover unconditional comparative belief
relations from comparative ones by conditioning on the tautology, Ω:
A  B⇔ A |Ω  B |Ω.
Say that a conditional comparative belief relation  on F is probabilisti-
cally representable if there is a conditional probability function that fully
agrees with it. More carefully: there is a probability function p : F → R
such that for any two propositions A, B ∈ F , and any two non-null propo-
sitions C,D ∈ F , we have
A | B  C | D ⇔ p(A ∩ B)
p(B)
≥ p(C ∩ D)
p(D)
.
A proposition X is non-null just in case it is not just as likely as the
contradiction, i.e.,
X |Ω 6≈ ∅ |Ω.
Now we can ask: when are conditional comparative belief relations prob-
abilistically representable? Domotor (1969) extends the results of Scott
(1964) to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for probabilistic rep-
resentability when  is defined on a finite algebra F . Suppes and Zanotti
(1982) extend the results of Suppes and Zanotti (1976) to provide necessary
and sufficient conditions in the general case (whether or not F is finite).
See Suppes (1994) for additional detail.
With a basic understanding of representation theorems and their me-
chanics in hand, we can now turn our attention to the central question of
this chapter: do comparative beliefs and representation theorems figure
into the best explanation of what precise credences are? If so, how? What
do these accounts of credence look like? And how do they stand up to the
criticisms of Hájek (2009), Meacham and Weisberg (2011), and Titelbaum
(2015)?
288 jason konek
3 the comparative belief-credence connection
To a first approximation, an agent’s credence function measures how
confident she can be said to be in each proposition. If c(X) = 1, then she is
maximally confident that X is true, i.e., 100% confident. If c(X) = 0, then
she is minimally confident that X is true, i.e., 0% confident. If c(X) = 2/3,
then she is more confident than not that X is true, but not quite fully
confident.
But what does this really mean? What does it mean to say that an agent
is 100%, or 80%, or 23.9556334% confident in a proposition?
We might have similar questions for imprecise Bayesians. Imprecise
Bayesians model rational agents’ opinions not with a single credence
function c, but with a set of credence functions C. Sets of credence func-
tions are called imprecise credal states (see Mahtani, this volume).10 To a
first approximation, imprecise credal states also measure how confident
agents can be said to be in various propositions. But they allow for a
strictly greater range of opinions than precise credal states. For example,
if c(X) = 1 for all c in C, then our agent is 100% confident that X is true.
If, however, 0.6 ≤ c(X) ≤ 0.9 for all c in C, and nothing stronger, then she
is at least 60% confident and at most 90% confident that X is true. But she
has no precise level of confidence for X. Precise credence functions allow
for the first sort of opinion, but not the second.
But again, what exactly does this mean? What does it mean to say
that an agent is at least 60% confident and at most 90% confident in a
proposition?
The history of Bayesianism is chock-full of different accounts of credence
that aim to answer this question. Very roughly, we can lump them into
three groups: measurement-theoretic accounts, decision-theoretic accounts,
and interpretivist accounts. Before exploring the differences between these
various accounts, it is worth emphasising one similarity. They all treat
‘credence function’ or ‘credal state’ in roughly the way Carnap treated
theoretical terms more generally. They carve out some theoretical role (or
set of roles) R as constitutive of what it is for a real-valued function, c, or
a set of such functions, C, to count as “your credal state.” The better c (or
C) plays role R, the more eligible it is as a “credal state candidate.” What
these accounts disagree on is what the relevant theoretical role R is.
10 Precise credal states are special cases of imprecise credal states, on the imprecise Bayesian
view. Formally, C is precise just in case C = {c} for some credence function c.
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3.1 Measurement-Theoretic Account of Credence
Measurement-theoretic accounts, like those of Koopman (1940a, 1940b), Good
(1950), and Krantz et al. (1971), treat credal states as mere numerical mea-
surement systems for comparative beliefs (or more generally, for some
underlying structure of comparative and qualitative opinions). Compare:
numerical measurement systems for length, mass, velocity, etc., allow
engineers, scientists and the like to measure certain parts of the system
of interest, perform numerical calculations, and draw inferences about
other parts of the system. Imagine, for example, measuring the length of
two pieces of wood arranged at a right angle, and using the Pythagorean
theorem to infer how long the diagonal must be.
Similarly, on the measurement-theoretic view, credal states are mere
numerical measurement systems. They allow you to measure certain
parts of an agent’s system of comparative beliefs, perform numerical
calculations, and draw conclusions about what other comparative beliefs
she must have (or must not have). Imagine, for example, that you elicit a
sufficient number of an agent’s comparative beliefs  to be quite confident
that (i) she satisfies Scott’s axioms, so that  fully agrees with some
probability function c, and further that (ii) c(X) = 0.3, c(Y) = 0.4, and
c(X ∩ Z) = c(Y ∩ Z) = 0. Given these measurements, you can use the
probability axioms to calculate that c(X ∪ Z) ≤ c(Y ∪ Z). Since c fully
agrees with , you can infer that X ∪ Z  Y ∪ Z. (See Section 5 for a more
complete introduction to the measurement-theoretic view.)
The upshot: just like measurement systems for physical quantities
(length, etc.), credal states allow you to represent comparative beliefs
in an elegant, easy-to-use, numerical fashion. And modeling comparative
(and qualitative) beliefs with numbers is useful. Numerical measurement
systems are designed specifically to reflect important structural features
of the underlying target system, so that you can use them to straightfor-
wardly extract information about one part of the system from information
about other parts.
Where does this leave us? The measurement-theoretic view takes a
particular stand on the nature of the theoretical role R that a function c
(or set of functions C) must play in order to count as “your credal state.”
More specifically, c (or C) must fully agree (or almost agree, or partially
agree, or strongly agree) with the agent’s comparative beliefs, , in the
way required to count as a numerical measurement system for . The
better c (or C) plays this role R, the more eligible it is as a credal state
candidate. Equally good measurement systems are equally eligible credal
state candidates.
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3.2 Decision-Theoretic Account of Credence
Decision-theoretic accounts of credence, like those of Ramsey (1931), de Finetti
(1931, 1964), and Walley (1991), carve out a rather different theoretical
role for credal states. Credal states, on these views, encode an agent’s fair
buying and selling prices. An agent’s fair buying price for a gamble G is,
roughly, the largest amount that she could pay for G while still leaving
herself (in her own view) in at least as good a position as the status quo.
An agent’s fair selling price for a gamble G is, roughly, the smallest amount
that someone else would have to pay her in exchange for G in order to
leave herself (in her own view) in at least as good a position as the status
quo.
To illustrate, imagine that you have an urn. The urn contains 10 balls.
Each ball is either red or black. There are at least 3 black balls, and at most
7 black balls. But you have no absolutely no idea whether the urn contains
3, 4, 5, 6, or 7 black balls.
Let G be the gamble that pays out £10 if a random draw from the urn
yields a black, and £0 otherwise. Given what you know about the contents
of the urn, you would likely judge that paying a measly £1 for G is a good
deal. Maybe £2 is a good deal too. But let’s imagine that £3 is your limit.
Paying any more than £3 would leave you in a situation where you are
no longer, in your own view, determinately doing at least as well as the
status quo. Then your fair buying price for G is 3. More carefully, your fair
buying price for G is 3 iff you weakly prefer paying 3 and receiving G to
the status quo, but not so for any amount higher than 3.
Similarly, suppose that a friend wants to buy G from you. They will
pay you some initial amount. Then you will pay them £10 if the draw
comes up black and £0 otherwise. Given what you know about the urn,
you would likely judge that selling G to your friend for £9 is a good deal
(for you, anyway). Maybe £8 is a good deal too. But let’s imagine that £7
is your limit. If they offer you any less than £7, then you would be left
in a position where you are no longer, in your own view, determinately
doing at least as well as the status quo. Then your fair selling price for G
is 7. More carefully, your fair selling price for G is 7 iff you weakly prefer
receiving 7 and selling G to the status quo, but not so for any amount
lower than 7.
On the decision-theoretic view, the principal theoretical role of an agent’s
credal state is to encode her fair buying and selling prices. A set E of real-
valued functions e counts as “your credal state” just in case its lower and
upper envelope for gambles G,
E [G] = inf {e(G) | e ∈ E} ,
E [G] = sup {e(G) | e ∈ E} ,
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are equal to your fair buying and selling prices for G, B(G) and S(G),
respectively, i.e., E [G] = B(G) and E [G] = S(G). (Treat a single real-valued
function e as the singleton E = {e}.) The better E plays this role R—the
closer its lower and upper envelopes are to your fair buying and selling
prices—the more eligible it is as a credal state candidate.
Your credal state only captures information about your beliefs, on this
view, insofar as they are reflected in your fair buying and selling prices.
For any proposition X ∈ F , let GX be the unit gamble on X, i.e., the gamble
that pays out £1 if X and £0 otherwise. Your lower and upper “previsions”
for GX, E [GX] and E [GX] (i.e., the value of the lower and upper envelopes
of E at GX), encode your fair buying and selling prices for GX. If you are
willing to pay something near £1 for a unit gamble on X (E [GX] ≈ 1),
then for the purposes of decision-making you are quite confident in X. If you
would be happy to sell a unit gamble on X to a friend for mere pennies
(E [GX] ≈ 0), then for the purposes of decision-making you have extremely
low confidence in X. If you would only buy a unit gamble on X for next to
nothing (E [GX] ≈ 0), and would only sell a unit gamble on for close to its
maximum payout (E [GX] ≈ 1), then for the purposes of decision-making
you have no idea whether X is true. Your opinions are rather imprecise.
The decision-theoretic view comes in many flavours—one for each way
of thinking about the preferences that determine your fair buying and
selling prices. On a flat-footed behaviourist view, B(G) is your fair buying
price for G just in case you actually buy G for B(G), and actually refuse to
buy G for any higher price (or perhaps do so a sufficiently high proportion
of the time). On a more sophisticated behaviourist view, B(G) is your fair
buying price for G just in case you are disposed to buy G for B(G), and
disposed to refuse to buy G for any higher price. Alternatively, we might
reject behaviourism in its various guises, and say that the preferences that
fix your fair buying/selling prices are irreducibly evaluative attitudes.
But where do comparative beliefs enter the picture? It may not appear
that comparative beliefs play an especially important role in explicating
the concept of credence on the decision-theoretic view. After all, on this
view, an agent’s credal state encodes her fair buying and selling prices.
And fair buying and selling prices are fixed by one’s preferences, not
their comparative beliefs. Even on Savage’s view, where comparative belief
reduces to preference, different fragments of an agent’s preference relation
fix her fair buying/selling prices and comparative beliefs, respectively.
Nonetheless, rational comparative beliefs and fair buying/selling prices
hang together in a certain way (Section 6). So comparative beliefs (and
representation theorems) will be important for answering the normative
question, even on the decision-theoretic view.
Also worth noting: if an agent has a precise credal state E = {e}, then
E [G] = E [G]
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for all gambles G. That is, her fair buying prices just are her fair selling
prices. The maximum amount she is willing to pay for G is precisely the
minimum amount she is willing to accept in exchange for selling G . Agents
with genuinely imprecise credal states (non-singleton E ), in contrast, may
well think that buying is worthwhile only at very low prices, and selling is
worthwhile only at very high prices. Imprecise Bayesians typically see this
as the proper (or at least a permissible) type of evaluative attitude to bear in
decision contexts where evidence is unspecific or ambiguous.
One final note: measurement-theoretic and decision-theoretic accounts
of credence can be difficult to distinguish in practice. Consider a propo-
nent of the measurement-theoretic account, such as Savage, who treats
comparative belief as reducible to preference (Savage, 1954, Section 3.2).
You judge that X  Y iff whenever you prefer one outcome to another, you
also prefer getting the better outcome if X than if Y. Then certain types
of measurement systems for comparative belief—viz., sets of probability
functions—encode fair buying and selling prices (see Section 6). Whence
the difference, then, between this sort of measurement-theoretic account
of credence, and a decision-theoretic account?
The difference is this. On the measurement-theoretic view, any numerical
measurement system for  does the work necessary to count as “your
credal state”—not just ones that encode your fair buying and selling
prices. Likewise, on the decision-theoretic view, any numerical system that
encodes your buying and selling prices counts as “your credal state.” But
some of those systems (viz. upper and lower previsions) carry too little
information to determine a numerical representation of your preference
relation (Walley, 2000, Section 6).
Shorter: even though some numerical systems do both jobs (measu-
rement-theoretic and decision-theoretic), it is possible to do one without
doing the other. So the two accounts make different predictions about
which functions (sets of functions) count as “eligible credal state candi-
dates.”
3.3 Interpretivist Account of Credence
Our final account of credence is the interpretivist account, of the sort es-
poused by Lewis (1974) and Maher (1993). According to preference-based
interpretivist accounts, like Patrick Maher’s, “an attribution of probabili-
ties and utilities is correct just in case it is part of an overall interpretation
of the person’s preferences that makes sufficiently good sense of them
and better sense than any competing interpretation does” (Maher, 1993, p.
12). And according to Maher, if some probabilistically coherent credence
function c and cardinal utility function u jointly agree with an agent A’s
preferences, in the following sense:
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A weakly prefers α to β
iff
Ec[α] ≥ Ec[β]
(where Ec[α] and Ec[β] are the expected utilities of acts α and β relative to
c and u, respectively), then c and u perfectly rationalise or make sense of that
agent’s preferences.
On Maher’s view, both credence functions and utility functions earn
their theoretical keep by rationalising preferences. If c and u rationalise
your preferences better than any competing c∗ and u∗, then c plays the
appropriate theoretical role to count as “your credal state,” and u plays
the appropriate theoretical role to count as “your utility function.” This
presupposes the thesis of the primacy of practical reason. Whether or
not c rationalises your comparative and qualitative beliefs, understood as
irreducibly doxastic attitudes, is neither here nor there. What makes c “your
credence function” is the fact that it helps to rationalise your preferences.
But we can distinguish another brand of interpretivism: epistemic inter-
pretivism. This is a new account of credence. So we will spend a bit of time
developing it.
According to epistemic interpretivism, credal states are assignments of
truth-value estimates (or sets of such assignments) that rationalise one’s
comparative beliefs (or more generally, her comparative and qualitative
opinions), understood as irreducibly doxastic attitudes. A function c :
F → R (or set C) counts as “your credal state” just in case it encodes truth-
value estimates (or constraints on such estimates) that best rationalise or
make sense of your comparative beliefs.
Spelling out epistemic interpretivism requires two things: (i) saying
something about what truth-value estimates are, and (ii) explaining what
it means for truth-value estimates to best rationalise a set of comparative
beliefs.
Estimates are familiar enough. For example, an analyst’s best estimate
of Tesla’s stock price 1 years hence might be $425. Your best estimate of
the number of bananas in a randomly selected bunch might be 5.7. And so
on. In each of these examples, there is the agent doing the estimating, there
is the quantity being estimated, and there is the estimate of that quantity.
For the purposes of spelling out epistemic interpretivism, it is the last of
these that matters most.
Estimates are numbers. But not all numbers are estimates. For example,
the numbers in the expression
1, 000, 000 > 2
are not estimates. What sorts of numbers are estimates then? Plausibly,
they are numbers that are subject to a certain standard of evaluation. A
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number is an estimate in a context iff it is evaluated qua estimate in that
context. In typical contexts of evaluation, numbers like 2 in expressions like
the above are not estimates because they are not evaluated qua estimates.
There is no quantity that it would be better or worse for 2 to be close to. It
is no better or worse for being close to the actual price of stock X, or the
actual dosage of drug Y, etc. In contrast, the number at the bottom of a
contractor’s quote—a paradigm of an estimate—is evaluated qua estimate.
It is quite bad, for example, if it is £20, 000 off the actual price of the job.
What exactly is it to evaluate a number qua estimate? We will not provide
a full answer here. But we can say something informative.
The type of phenomenon under consideration—evaluating an entity E
qua X—is a common one. You might be brilliant qua scientist, mediocre
qua mentor, and terrible qua conversationalist. The reason seems to be
this: scientists, mentors and conversationalists all perform characteristic
functions. And you can perform some functions well while performing
others poorly. Microbiologists, for example, carefully dissect tissue samples,
meticulously document their experiments, write up academic papers,
communicate their results at conferences, etc. Conversationalists, on the
other hand, ask engaging questions, are familiar with current events, and
so on. You might well dissect tissue samples masterfully, but have no idea
what the news of the day is.
This suggests the following. Evaluating an entity E in some capacity X , or
qua X , is a matter of evaluating E on the basis of how well it performs the
characteristic functions F1, . . . ,Fn associated with X . What to say about
estimates in particular then? What characteristic functions do they serve,
for example, in scientific inquiry, engineering, finance, etc.? Whatever the
full answer is, the following seems non-negotiable: an estimate of quantity
Q serves the function of approximating the true value of Q. So ceteris
paribus it is better the closer it is to the true value of Q.
Note that, on the present account, for a number to count as an estimate in
a context, there must be an evaluator in that context; an agent evaluating the
number qua estimate. (This need not require having the concept estimate,
or anything of the sort. Evaluating a number qua estimate might be a fairly
cognitively undemanding task.) But there need be no estimator; no agent
producing the estimate; no agent explicitly judging that this is the best
estimate of that, etc.
Thermometers provide estimates of temperature. Geiger counters pro-
vide estimates of radiation. Ditto for other measurement devices. In each
of these cases, there is an estimate (38◦C, 0.10mSv, etc.), but no estimator;
no agent doing the estimating. Similarly, a tree’s rings provide an estimate
of its age. Your parents’ income provides an estimate of your income.
Again, estimates without estimators. And estimates, of course, do not need
to be good. The number of tea leaves concentrated in one part of your cup
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provides a (thoroughly unreliable) estimate of the number of fortunate
events in your future. Once more: estimate, but no estimator.
The upshot: we can talk of estimates doing this or that—for example,
rationalising a set of comparative beliefs—even if those estimates do not
“belong” to anyone. Estimates without estimators.
Back to our original question: what are truth-value estimates? We have
made some progress in saying what estimates are more generally. Now,
following de Finetti and Jeffrey, treat a proposition X as an “indicator
variable” that takes the value 1 at worlds where X is true, and 0 where X
is false. Truth-value estimates, then, are simply estimates of the value, 0 or
1, that the proposition takes at the actual world.
To finish spelling out the epistemic interpretivist account of credence, we
need to explain what it means for truth-value estimates to “best rationalise”
a set of comparative beliefs. To get a feel for how this might work, consider
an example. Grandma relies on folklore methods for predicting the weather.
She feels things in her bones, observes the behaviour of the cows in the
pasture, etc. You are not sure whether the weather-related opinions that
Grandma comes to on this basis make much sense or not. But then you
open your weather app. Lo and behold, you find a bunch of estimates—
probabilities for sun, clouds, rain, etc., estimates of rainfall amount, hour-
by-hour temperature estimates, etc.—that recommend thinking precisely
what Grandma thinks. For example, Grandma thinks it is likelier than not
to rain this evening. And the weather app recommends thinking that too.
It specifies a greater than 50% probability of rain. (We will explore a few
different accounts of recommendation shortly.)
The weather app’s estimates recommend having Grandma’s opinions.
And these estimates are themselves eminently rational. In virtue of this,
they rationalise or make sense of those opinions.
Note, however, that the weather app itself is not essential to this story.
Estimates do not need an estimator. If there exists some rational set of
estimates that recommend Grandma’s opinions, then whether or not
any weather app actually spits those estimates out, or any meteorologist
actually judges those estimates to be best—or indeed whether any artificial
or human system is in the business of explicitly estimating quantities
at all—Grandma’s opinions are nonetheless rationalisable. The rational
estimates that recommend her opinions provide that rationale.
Before saying something more general about when a set of truth-value
estimates best rationalises a set of comparative beliefs, we should key
in on two important features of our example. The first is the strength
of the recommendation in question. The second is the quality of that
recommendation.
We stipulated that the weather app’s estimates recommend having
Grandma’s opinions. This makes it seem as though recommendation is
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an on-off matter. But recommendations plausibly come in degrees. You
can recommend a trip to the Alps a little more strongly than a trip to
Tahoe, but much more strongly than a trip to Cudahy, Wisconsin. In our
example, the weather app’s estimates most strongly recommend thinking
precisely what Grandma thinks. We might have stipulated, however, that
they recommend a similar but distinct state of opinion most strongly, and
recommend Grandma’s state of opinion a little less strongly. In that case,
the weather app’s estimates provide a fairly strong, but not maximally
strong rationale for Grandma’s state of opinion.
In addition to the strength of a recommendation, we can consider the
quality of that recommendation. We stipulated that the weather app’s
estimates are eminently rational. But our weather app could have been a
bit glitchy and delivered mildly irrational estimates (ones that violate the
probability axioms, perhaps, but not by much). Those estimates might still
recommend thinking what Grandma thinks just as strongly. But in virtue
of their mild irrationality, they provide a slight lower quality rationale for
Grandma’s state of opinion.
The distinction between strength and quality is important. If Grandma’s
state of opinion is epistemically defective, it may turn out that no estimates
unreservedly recommend it, i.e., recommend it at least as strongly as any
other state of opinion. Every set of estimates might recommend some other
state of opinion more strongly. Nonetheless, some sets of estimates might
recommend Grandma’s state of opinion more strongly than others. And
amongst the sets of estimates that recommend it as strongly as possible
(at least as strongly as any other set of estimates), some might provide a
higher quality recommendation than others. The extent to which a set of
estimates rationalises or makes sense of a state of opinion depends on both
strength and quality. To provide the best possible rationale for Grandma’s
state of opinion, for example, a set of estimates must (i) recommend
that state as strongly as possible, and (ii) must provide the highest quality
recommendation from amongst the sets of estimates that satisfy (i).
Let’s take stock. According to epistemic interpretivism, a function c :
F → R (or set of functions C) counts as “your credal state” just in case
it encodes truth-value estimates (or constraints on such estimates) that
best rationalise or make sense of your comparative beliefs. We gave a brief
account of estimatehood to fill this out a bit. And we quickly unpacked
what it means for c (or C) to “best rationalise” your comparative beliefs,
. To best rationalise , c should provide at least as strong a rationale for 
as any other set of truth-value estimates c∗. And on the picture sketched
above, c provides a rationale for  by recommending . So for c to count
as “your credal state,” no other c∗ can recommend  more strongly than
c. Moreover, amongst the truth-value estimates that provide a maximally
strong rationale for  (recommend it as strongly as possible), c should
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provide at least as high quality a rationale as any other c∗. On the picture
sketched above, the quality of c’s rationale depends on how close c itself
is to rational. So for c to count as “your credal state,” no other c∗ that
recommends  as strongly as possible should be more rational than c.
Pulling this all together, c (or C) counts as “your credal state” just in case
it encodes truth-value estimates (or constraints on such estimates) that
recommend your comparative beliefs as strongly as possible, and are as
rational as possible whilst doing so. See Figure 5.
c1 c2 c3
Estimates that recom-
mend your compara-
tive beliefs as strongly
as possible
Maximally
rational
estimates
Provides some
rationale for
your
comparative be-
liefs
Provides a
higher quality
rationale
Provides the
highest quality
rationale
Figure 5: More rational estimates provide higher quality rationales.
The big lingering question is this: when exactly does a set of truth-
value estimates recommend a certain set of comparative beliefs more or less
strongly? There are a number of ways one could spell this out. We will not
defend a particular account of recommendation here. But here are three
options.
Metaphysical Account. The truth-value estimates given by
c : F → R recommend  to degree k iff it is metaphysically
necessary that any agent who explicitly judges c(X) to be the
best truth-value estimate for X, for all X ∈ F , has comparative
beliefs c and D(c,) = 1/k, where D is some reasonable
measure of distance between comparative belief relations.
On the metaphysical account, judging c : F → R to encode the best truth-
value estimates for propositions in F entails having certain comparative
beliefs c. Since having comparative beliefs c is part and parcel of judg-
ing c best, c recommends c as strongly as possible. And c recommends
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other comparative beliefs, , less strongly the further away they are from
c. See Deza and Deza (2009) and Fitelson and McCarthy (2015) for more
information on measures of distance between comparative belief relations.
Our next account says that while judging c to encode the best truth-value
estimates may not entail that you have some set of comparative beliefs
or other, it nevertheless rationally requires you to have those beliefs. And
we can use this fact to say what it is for a set of truth-value estimates to
recommend comparative belief relations to different degrees.
Normative Account. The truth-value estimates given by c :
F → R recommend  to degree k iff it is rationally required
that any agent who explicitly judges c(X) to be the best truth-
value estimate for X, for all X ∈ F , has comparative beliefs c
and D(c,) = 1/k, where D is some reasonable measure of
distance between comparative belief relations.
A proponent of the normative account might treat the principles of
rationality that generate the relevant requirement as properly basic compo-
nents of her epistemology. Alternatively, she might provide a teleological
explanation of why those principles have the normative force that they do
by appealing to facts about epistemic value or utility. One final account of
recommendation—the epistemic utility account—explains recommendation
more directly in terms of epistemic value/utility facts. Informally, the epis-
temic utility account says that c recommends  to degree k just in case the
most rational way of adding estimates of the value of comparative beliefs
to the stock of truth-value estimates encoded by c involves estimating 
to have epistemic utility k.
Let’s make this a little more precise. An assignment of truth-value
estimates c : F → R (or set C) maps a very specific kind of measurable
quantity—propositions or indicator functions—to estimates. Let Q be the set
of all measurable quantities Q : Ω → R. An assignment est : Q → R of
estimates to measurable quantities extends c just in case c(X) = est(X) for
all X ∈ F .
To make sense of something being closer or further from rational, we
need two things: an epistemic utility function U and laws of preference L.
First let’s talk about U . For any assignment of truth-value estimates
c, U (c,w) measures how epistemically valuable c is at world w. What-
ever properties make truth-value estimates epistemically valuable at a
world, U (c,w) captures the extent to which c has a good balance of these
properties at w. Likewise, U (,w) measures how epistemically valuable
comparative beliefs  are at world w. For a philosophically rich discussion
of how to measure the epistemic value of estimates, see Joyce (2009) and
Pettigrew (2016).
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Laws of preference L are familiar from decision theory. In conjunction
with U , they specify rationally permissible ways of structuring one’s
preferences over options. For example, the law of dominance says that if
one option o is guaranteed to have higher utility than another option o∗,
then you ought to prefer o to o∗. Likewise, the law of (first-order) stochastic
dominance says: if for any possible utility value x, o is guaranteed to have
greater chance than o∗ of having higher-than-x utility, then you ought to
prefer o to o∗. And so on.
Let T be the set of rational truth-value estimates, relative to U and L,
i.e., the set of c that are not dispreferred to some other c∗. Let E be the set
of rational estimates more generally relative to U and L, i.e., the set of est
that are not dispreferred to some other est∗.
Say that est is the maximally rational extension of c to Q iff (i) est extends
c to Q, and (ii) est is closer to rational (i.e., closer to E ) than any other est∗
that extends c to Q.
We can now state the epistemic utility account more precisely.
Epistemic Utility Account. The truth-value estimates given by
c : F → R recommends to degree k iff the maximally rational
extension of c to Q, estc, is such that such that estc(U ()) = k.
The basic thought here is that while c might not directly encode estimates
of quantities other than truth-values, it nonetheless takes a stand on how
to estimate those quantities. It encodes such estimates indirectly. There is
some most rational way of adding estimates of other measurable quantities
Q to the stock of truth-value estimates encoded by c. These estimates,
estc(Q), are the best estimates of those quantities, from c’s perspective.
So, in effect, the epistemic utility account says that c recommends  to
degree k just in case it indirectly estimates  to be epistemically valuable
to degree k.
There are no doubt myriad unanswered questions about each of these
accounts of recommendation. It is not our purpose to provide a full defense
of any particular account. Just note that you can choose your favourite
(or one not on the list) and slot it into our official version of epistemic
interpretivism.
Epistemic Interpretivism. A function c (or set C) counts as
“your credal state” iff it best rationalises your comparative
beliefs . Moreover, c (or set C) best rationalises  iff (i) it
recommends  as strongly as possible, so that no other c∗
(or set C∗) recommends  to a higher degree, and (ii) c is
itself closer to rational (closer to T ) than any other c∗ that
recommends  as strongly as possible.
Even setting aside questions about how to understand recommendation,
there are various lingering questions about epistemic interpretivism. For
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example, one might wonder what makes comparative beliefs more or less
epistemically valuable at a world, or how to measure such value. See
Fitelson and McCarthy (2015) for an investigation of “additive” epistemic
utility measures for comparative belief. One might also wonder what
makes one set of estimates closer to rational than another. For a nuanced
discussion, see Staffel (2018). We will not address these questions here. But
we will evaluate epistemic interpretivism in a bit more depth in Section 7.
4 challenges to the relevance of representation theorems
We now have a number of accounts of credence on the table, however
briefly sketched. These accounts purport to tell us what it means to say
that an agent is x% confident in a proposition (if she has precise credences),
or between y% and z% confident (if she has imprecise credences).
Proponents of these accounts use them to answer some important ques-
tions. For example, when exactly is there a real-valued function c (or set
C) that plays the relevant theoretical role R well enough to count as “your
credal state”? Following Meacham and Weisberg (2011), we will call this
the characterisation question. And why should we expect rational agents
to have probabilistically coherent credences? We will call this the normative
question.
In answering these questions, proponents typically invoke coherence
constraints (on either preference or comparative belief) and representation
theorems. Hájek (2009), Meacham and Weisberg (2011), and Titelbaum
(2015) challenge any such approach. Whatever account of credence you
adopt, they argue, there is no plausible representation-theorem-centric
narrative that could answer these questions. Their objections are many. We
will focus on a few central ones.
Hájek, Meacham and Weisberg, and Titelbaum all imagine that the
“basic representation theorem argument” goes as follows.
1. Coherence Constraints. Any rational agent’s comparative belief rela-
tion  satisfies coherence constraints φ.
2. Representation Theorem. Relation  satisfies constraints φ if and only
if  fully agrees (or almost agrees, or partially agrees, or strongly
agrees) with some probability function c (or set of probability func-
tions C).
C. Probabilism. Any rational agent has probabilistic credences (either
precise credences given by c, or imprecise credences given by C).
If successful, this argument would at least partially answer both the char-
acterisation and normative question at once. When is there a credence
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function c, or a set of such functions C, that plays the relevant theoret-
ical role R well enough to count as your credal state? Whenever your
comparative beliefs satisfy coherence constraints φ! Satisfying φ is a suffi-
cient condition for having credences. And why should we expect rational
agents to have probabilistically coherent credences? Because the coherence
constraints φ are rationally mandatory. And any agent who satisfies φ not
only has credences, but probabilistically coherent credences.
But this argument is not successful as it stands. As Eriksson and Hájek
(2007), Hájek (2009), Meacham and Weisberg (2011), and Titelbaum (2015)
emphasise, it does not follow from the mere fact that some probabilistically
coherent credence function fully agrees with her comparative beliefs that
she in fact has probabilistic credences. So the argument is invalid. Hájek
puts the point as follows (cf. also Meacham and Weisberg, 2011, p. 14, and
Titelbaum, 2015, p. 274):
the mere possibility of representing you one way or another
might have less force than we want; your acting as if the repre-
sentation is true of you does not make it true of you. To make
this concern vivid, suppose that I represent your preferences
with Voodooism. My voodoo theory says that there are warring
voodoo spirits inside you. When you prefer A to B, then there
are more A-favouring spirits inside you than B-favouring spir-
its [. . . ] I then ‘prove’ Voodooism: if your preferences obey the
usual rationality axioms, then there exists a Voodoo represen-
tation of you. That is, you act as if there are warring voodoo
spirits inside you in conformity with Voodooism. Conclusion:
rationality requires you to have warring Voodoo spirits in you.
Not a happy result. (Hájek, 2009, p. 238)
The same thing, these objectors claim, can be said about the representation
theorem argument for probabilism. Just because your preferences can
be represented as the end product of a vigorous war between the voodoo
spirits inside you does not imply that you in fact have such spirits inside
you. Similarly, just because your comparative beliefs can be represented as
arising from precise credences c (or imprecise credences C) does not imply
that you in fact have such credences.
This line of criticism is not particularly concerning. The reason: no
Bayesians put forward this basic “representation theorem argument.”
Koopman, Savage, Joyce, etc.; they all presuppose some account of credence
or other. For example, Krantz et al. presuppose a measurement-theoretic
account of credence.
we inquire into conditions under which an ordering  of E
has an order-preserving function P that satisfies Definition
2. Obviously, the ordering is to be interpreted empirically as
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meaning “qualitatively at least as probable as.” Put another
way, we shall attempt to treat the assignment of probabilities
to events as a measurement problem of the same fundamental
character as the measurement of, e.g., mass or momentum.
(Krantz et al., 1971, pp. 199–202)
The upshot: any faithful reconstruction of the “representation theorem
argument” really ought to feature an account of credence explicitly as a
premise. The simple argument under attack here fails this basic test.
Of course, objectors do not focus exclusively on this simple version
of the representation theorem argument. Hájek, Meacham and Weisberg,
and Titelbaum all consider more sophisticated versions as well. A fairly
general, more charitable way of understanding what fans of representation
theorems are up to is this. Firstly, to shed some light on the characterisation
question, they establish a “Bridge Theorem” which shows that the function
c, or set of functions C, outputted by their favourite representation theorem
is fit to play the theoretical role R singled out by their favourite account
of credence.
Bridge Theorem. If  satisfies φ, then at least one of the prob-
ability functions c (or set of probability functions C) whose
existence is guaranteed by the Representation Theorem plays role
R well enough to count as “your credal state.”
Secondly, to answer the normative question, they put their favourite ac-
count of credence, their favourite representation theorem, and this bridge
theorem to work in order to provide a more sophisticated argument for
probabilism.
1. Coherence Constraints. Any rational agent’s comparative belief rela-
tion  satisfies coherence constraints φ.
2. Theory of Credence. A real-valued function c (or set C) counts as
“your credal state” to the extent that it plays theoretical role R. The
better c (or C) plays role R, the more eligible it is as a “credal state
candidate.”
3. Representation Theorem. Relation  satisfies constraints φ if and only
if  fully agrees (or almost agrees, or partially agrees, or strongly
agrees) with some probability function c (or set of probability func-
tions C).
4. Bridge Theorem. If  satisfies φ, then at least one of the probability
functions c (or set of probability functions C) whose existence is
guaranteed by the Representation Theorem plays role R well enough
to count as “your credal state.”
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C. Probabilism. Any rational agent has probabilistic credences (either
precise credences given by c, or imprecise credences given by C).
In Section 5–7, we will evaluate how this argument fares on each of our
competing accounts of credence. But it is worth addressing some general
concerns about this argumentative strategy here.11
Meacham andWeisberg worry that even if the axioms φ of your favourite
representation theorem encode genuine coherence constraints on rational
comparative belief, ordinary folks like you and me are not typically rational
(Meacham & Weisberg, 2011, pp. 7–8).12 Our comparative beliefs violate
these constraints φ. So even if the Bridge Theorem is correct—even if
the representation theorem in question would output a function c, or a
set of functions C that deserves to be called “your credal state” if your
comparative beliefs satisfied φ—it is silent about ordinary folks. The
upshot: it does not help to answer the characterisation question in any
interesting way. While it does specify sufficient conditions for having
credences, those conditions are so demanding that they are more or less
irrelevant for agents like us.
This concern, however, does not cut much ice. As we will see in Section 5–
7, there is plenty to say about when ordinary folks—folks who reliably
violate constraints of rationality—count as having credences on each of
our competing accounts (measurement-theoretic, decision-theoretic, and
epistemic interpretivist).
Meacham and Weisberg also worry that the “representation theorem ar-
gument” trivialises normative epistemology (Meacham & Weisberg, 2011,
pp. 14–16). There is a gap, recall, between representability and psycho-
logical reality. Just because your comparative beliefs can be represented
as arising from precise credences c (or imprecise credences C) does not
imply that you in fact have such credences. To avoid this problem, the
objection goes, representation theorem arguments must stipulatively define
an agent’s credences to be given by the function c (or set C) outputted by
one’s favourite representation theorem. But those theorems deliver proba-
bilistic representations by construction. So it is simply true by stipulative
definition that whenever an agent has credences, they are probabilistically
coherent. Whence the normative force of probabilism then? The claim that
rational credences are probabilistically coherent is trivial if all credences
are probabilistically coherent by definition.
11 The following objections are adapted from Hájek (2009), Meacham and Weisberg (2011),
and Titelbaum (2015).
12 Meacham andWeisberg are concerned primarily with representation theorems for preference
relations. Accordingly, they focus on empirical data that shows that ordinary agents reliably
violate putative coherence constraints on rational preference. For example, Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) show that subjects consistently violate Savage’s Independence Axiom, and
Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971, 1973) show that subjects often have intransitive preferences.
We adapt their concerns to the case of comparative belief mutatis mutandis.
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But again this concern need not give us much pause. We do not need
to bridge the gap between representability and psychological reality by
stipulative definition. Rather, we bridge that gap by (i) providing a theory
of credence, which specifies the theoretical role R that a function c (or set
C) must play to count as “your credal state,” and (ii) providing a bridge
theorem, which establishes that some function c (or set C) outputted by
one’s favourite representation theorem in fact plays roleR sufficiently well.
This strategy does not stipulatively define your credences as those given
by c (or C). Far from it. Establishing that c (or C) plays R well enough to
count as “your credal state” requires substantive argumentation.
It is safe, then, to put these general concerns to the side. Of course, their
spectre lingers until we see the details about the relevant bridge theorems
and so on (Section 5–7). We now turn our attention to evaluating how
well this strategy answers the characterisation and normative questions,
respectively, on each of our competing accounts of credence.
5 evaluating the measurement-theoretic view
5.1 Interpreting Credence Functions
On the measurement-theoretic view, a credence function c (or set C) is
a mere numerical measurement system. It allows you to represent an
agent’s comparative belief structure, 〈Ω,F ,〉, numerically in the follow-
ing sense. Firstly, c maps the propositions X in F to real-valued proxies,
c(X). Secondly, it does so in a “structure-preserving fashion.” If c fully
agrees with , then one proxy c(X) is larger than another c(Y) exactly
when our agent is more confident in X than Y (and c(X) = c(Y) exactly
when she is equally confident in X and Y):
X  Y ⇔ c(X) ≥ c(Y).
In this sense, the familiar “greater than or equal to” relation ≥ on the
real numbers “preserves the structure” of our agent’s comparative belief
relation  on F . Because of this, you can use the numerical measurement
system in helpful ways. You can elicit certain comparative beliefs, infer
properties of c, perform numerical calculations, and draw conclusions
about what other comparative beliefs she must have (or must not have).
Similarly, a set of real-valued functions C can provide a numerical
measurement system for . If C fully agrees with , then the c in C
uniformly assign larger proxies to X than Y exactly when our agent is
more confident in X than Y (and uniformly assign equal proxies exactly
when she is equally confident in X and Y):
X  Y ⇔ c(X) ≥ c(Y) for all c ∈ C.
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Once more, this allows you to use the (imprecise) numerical measurement
system C in helpful ways. You can elicit certain comparative beliefs, infer
properties of C, perform numerical calculations, and draw conclusions
about what other comparative beliefs she must have (or must not have).
Weaker types of agreement yield numerical measurement systems fit
for slightly different purposes. Suppose, for example, that c strongly agrees
with :
X  Y ⇒ c(X) ≥ c(Y),
X ≻ Y ⇒ c(X) > c(Y).
Such a measurement system licenses fewer inferences about  than fully
agreeing systems. To see this, imagine that c is a probability function, X
and Y are both incompatible with Z, and X ≻ Y. Then since c strongly
agrees with , we have c(X) > c(Y). And since c is a probability function,
c(X ∪ Z) > c(Y ∪ Z). Hence c(X ∪ Z) 6≤ c(Y ∪ Z). From this we can infer
that X ∪ Z 6 Y ∪ Z. But we cannot infer that X ∪ Z  Y ∪ Z. If, on the
other hand, c were to fully agree with , then we could make this latter
inference.
To recap: the measurement-theoretic view takes a particular stand on
the nature of the theoretical role R that a function c (or set C) must play
in order to count as “your credal state.” More specifically, c (or C) must
fully agree (or almost agree, or partially agree, or strongly agree) with the
agent’s comparative beliefs, , in the way required to count as a numerical
measurement system for . The better c (or C) plays this role R, the more
eligible it is as a credal state candidate.
Importantly, though, any function c (or set C) that plays this role R has
equal claim to be called “your credence function,” on the measurement-
theoretic view. Any order-preserving mapping (homomorphism) from
F into R is just as eligible as a credal state candidate as any other. So
credence functions are not unique. Indeed, if c fully agrees (or almost
agrees, or partially agrees, or strongly agrees) with , then any of the
infinitely many strictly increasing transformations of c do so as well. So
if you have one credence function, on this view, then you have infinitely
many.
In addition, interpreting credence functions requires care, on the
measurement-theoretic view. An agent’s credence function does not
wear its representationally significant features on its sleeve. Sorting out
which features of one’s credence function are representationally significant,
rather than “mere artefacts,” requires knowing what the “permissible
transformations” of that credence function are. That is, it requires knowing
not only that b counts as “your credence function,” but also what other
functions c preserve the structure of your comparative and qualitative
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beliefs, and so count as “your credence function” as well. For example, on
the standard Bayesian picture, an agent’s credence function c is such that
c(X ∩Y)
c(Y)
= c(X)
just in case she judges that Y is evidentially independent of X. But if
credence functions c are mere numerical measurement systems for an
agent’s comparative beliefs , then properties like c(X ∩Y)/c(Y) = c(X)
are not representationally significant. They do not reflect anything real
about the agent’s doxastic state.
To see this, imagine that you take two blood tests. Let w++ be the world
in which both tests come back positive; w+− be the world in which the first
comes back positive and the second negative; w−+ be the world in which
the first comes back negative and the second positive; and w−− be the world
in which both tests come back negative. You have comparative beliefs over
propositions in the following Boolean algebra:
F =


{
w++,w
+
−,w
−
+,w
−
−
}
{
w++,w
+
−,w
−
+
}
,
{
w++,w
+
−,w
−
−
}
{
w++,w
−
+,w
−
−
}
,
{
w+−,w
−
+,w
−
−
}
{
w++,w
+
−
}
,
{
w++,w
−
+
}
,
{
w++,w
−
−
}
{
w+−,w
−
+
}
,
{
w+−,w
−
−
}
,
{
w−+,w
−
−
}
,{
w++
}
,
{
w+−
}
,
{
w−+
}
,
{
w−−
}
,
∅


.
In particular, your comparative beliefs are given by:{
w++,w
+
−,w
−
+,w
−
−
}
≻
{
w++,w
−
+,w
−
−
}
≻
{
w++,w
+
−
}
≻
{
w−+,w
+
−,w
−
−
}
≻
{
w+−,w
−
−
}
≻
{
w−+,w
+
−
}
≻
{
w+−
}
≻
{
w++,w
−
+,w
−
−
}
≻
{
w++,w
−
−
}
≻
{
w++,w
−
+
}
≻
{
w++
}
≻
{
w−+,w
−
−
}
≻
{
w−−
}
≻
{
w−+
}
≻ ∅.
Then the probability functions b and c in Table 1 both fully agree with ,
and hence both count as a numerical measurement systems for . So both
play the credal state role, on the measurement-theoretic view. But b is such
that
b(
{
w++
}
)
b(
{
w++,w
+
−
}
)
=
1
3
= b(
{
w++,w
−
+
}
).
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w++ w
+
− w
−
+ w
−
−
b 1136
22
36
1
36
2
36
c 2064
33
64
4
64
7
64
Table 1: Probability functions b and c on F . Both fully agree with .
Given that b is your credence function, the standard interpretation says:
you think that the result of the first test provides no evidence one way or
the other about the result of the second test. On the other hand, c is such
that
c(
{
w++
}
)
c(
{
w++,w
+
−
}
)
=
20
53
>
24
64
= c(
{
w++,w
−
+
}
).
Given that c is your credence function, the standard interpretation says:
you judge that a positive outcome on the second test supports or confirms
a positive outcome on the first test. Finding out that the second test is
positive increases your credence that the first test is positive too.
What is going on here? Answer: the “standard interpretation” reads
more information into one’s credence function than is actually encoded
in that credence function. On the measurement-theoretic view, credence
functions are nothing more than numerical measurement systems that
encode the ordering determined by your comparative beliefs. (They are
mere “ordinal scale” measurement systems, not “ratio scale” measurement
systems.) But there is more to making judgments of evidential relevance
and irrelevance than having a particular constellation of comparative
beliefs. Agents who only have comparative beliefs simply are not opinion-
ated enough to count as having opinions about evidential relevance and
irrelevance. So credence functions do not reflect any such opinions.
Interpreting imprecise credal states requires care too. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that you have opinions about the propositions in the Boolean
algebra
F ∗ = {Ω,X,¬X,∅} .
Consider the precise and imprecise credal states on F ∗ given by the
probability function b in Table 2 and the set of probability functions C:
Ω X ¬X ∅
b 1 0.7 0.3 0
Table 2: Probability function b on F ∗
C = {c | c(Ω) > c(X) > c(¬X) > c(∅)} .
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On the standard interpretation, b and C represent different doxastic states.
An agent with credence function b is precisely 70% confident that X is true.
An agent with imprecise credal state C, in contrast, is at least 50% confident
that X is true, but nothing stronger. On the standard interpretation, these
are not idle differences. These differences in doxastic states are reflected in
one’s evaluative attitudes. For example, an agent with credence function b
will have precisely the same fair buying and selling price for a unit gamble
G on X, viz., 0.7. Paying any price up to £0.7 for G is a good deal in her
view. Selling G for any price over £0.7 is a good deal. But an agent with
imprecise credal state C will have different buying and selling prices for G.
Paying any price up to £0.5 for G is a good deal, in her view. But selling G
is only a determinately good deal if the buyer is willing to pay more than
£1.
On the measurement-theoretic view, however, b and C represent exactly
the same doxastic state. They both fully agree with the following comparative
belief relation :
Ω ≻ X ≻ ¬X ≻ ∅.
They are both order-preserving mappings from F ∗ into the reals that
preserve exactly the same structure. In this case, there is simply no substantive
difference between being 70% confident, or 89.637% confident, or at least
50% confident that X is true. Only the comparative beliefs that b and
C encode are psychologically real. Everything else is a “mere artefact”
of one’s preferred numerical measurement system. Both b and C, and
any other credal state that fully agrees with , plays exactly the same
theoretical role: they represent the comparative beliefs captured by  in
an elegant, easy-to-use, numerical fashion—nothing more, nothing less.
5.2 Unary and Pluralist Variants
We have focussed thus far on a particular unary variant of the measurement-
theoretic view. On this view, credence functions are mere numerical mea-
sures of one’s comparative beliefs. Having credences is nothing over and
above having numerically representable comparative beliefs. You might be
attracted to this view if, for example, you think that we can explain and
rationalise everything important about choice and inference by appealing
exclusively to comparative belief—no additional modes or types of dox-
astic judgment necessary. In that case, you might say: to the extent that
we are willing to talk about prima facie distinct types of opinion—degrees
of belief, full or categorical belief, etc.—they ought to ultimately reduce
to comparative beliefs. Reducing those other types of opinion away will
allow us to provide the simplest and most unified possible explanations
of the relevant data regarding choice and inference.
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But there is also a pluralist variant of the measurement-theoretic view,
which you might find attractive if you are less optimistic about the explana-
tory power of comparative belief. On the pluralist version, agents have
a genuine plurality of doxastic attitudes, not simply comparative beliefs.
In addition to comparative beliefs, agents also have: (i) opinions about
the evidential dependence or independence of one hypothesis on another; (ii)
opinions about the causal dependence or independence of one variable on
another; (iii) full or categorical beliefs; they may even (iv) explicitly estimate
the values of all sorts of different variables, including the frequency of
truths in a set of propositions, and the truth-values of individual proposi-
tions. Estimating, in this sense, is a matter of making a sui generis doxastic
judgment—a type of judgment that may bear interesting relations to other
types of judgments (normative relations, causal relations, etc.), but is not
reducible to them. Estimating the truth-value of a proposition, in this
sense, is what Jeffrey (2002) calls having an exact judgmental probability for
the truth of that proposition.
On the pluralist measurement-theoretic view, your credence function
is a mere numerical measurement system, but not a measure specifically
of your comparative belief relation. Rather, on the pluralist view, you have a
genuine plurality of comparative and qualitative doxastic attitudes, and
your credence function is a measure of that entire system of attitudes.
Consider once again our blood test example. You have the following
comparative beliefs:{
w++,w
+
−,w
−
+,w
−
−
}
≻
{
w++,w
+
−,w
−
−
}
≻
{
w++,w
−
+,w
+
−
}
≻
{
w++,w
+
−
}
≻
{
w−+,w
+
−,w
−
−
}
≻
{
w+−,w
−
−
}
≻
{
w−+,w
+
−
}
≻
{
w+−
}
≻
{
w++,w
−
+,w
−
−
}
≻
{
w++,w
−
−
}
≻
{
w++,w
−
+
}
≻
{
w++
}
≻
{
w−+,w
−
−
}
≻
{
w−−
}
≻
{
w−+
}
≻ ∅.
But now imagine that you have a wide range of comparative and quali-
tative opinions, not just comparative beliefs. You think, for example, that
when you find out the result of the first test (positive or negative), this pro-
vides no evidence one way or the other about the result of the second test.
(Perhaps the tests probe two different, unrelated conditions.) That is, you
judge {w++,w+−} and {w−+,w−−} to be evidentially independent of {w++,w−+}
and {w+−,w−−}, and vice versa.
In addition, you have certain full beliefs or categorical beliefs. Let’s suppose
that you believe that the first test will come back positive. (It probes for a
condition that you quite clearly have.) That is, you fully believe {w++,w+−}.
And you believe all of the logical consequences of this proposition. But
you have no further full or categorical beliefs.
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Finally, you judge 1/3 to be the best estimate of the truth-value of the
proposition that the second test will come back positive. (Recall, a proposi-
tion’s truth-value is 1 if it is true and 0 if it is false.) In Jeffrey’s parlance,
you have a judgmental probability of 1/3 for the proposition {w++,w−+}.
So you have a genuine plurality of doxastic attitudes: you have com-
parative beliefs; you make evidential independence judgments; you have
full or categorical beliefs; you also estimate the truth-values of certain
propositions (you have exact judgmental probabilities). On the pluralist
measurement-theoretic view, your credence function is a measure of this
entire system of attitudes.
To make this more precise, let’s model your doxastic attitudes using a
relational structure:
A = 〈F ,, I ,B, E1/3〉 .
A comprises your Boolean algebra F of subsets of Ω = {w++,w+−,w−+,w−−},
together with a comparative belief relation  on F , an independence relation
I , a (unary) belief relation B, and a (unary) estimation relation E1/3.
I models your evidential independence judgments. It will be convenient
to think of I as a 3-place relation on F :
I(X,Y,X ∩Y)
iff
you judge X to be evidentially independent of Y.
Since you judge {w++,w+−} and {w−+,w−−} to be independent of {w++,w−+}
and {w+−,w−−}, and vice versa, we have:
I(
{
w++,w
+
−
}
,
{
w++,w
−
+
}
,
{
w++
}
),
I(
{
w−+,w
−
−
}
,
{
w++,w
−
+
}
,
{
w−+
}
),
I(
{
w++,w
+
−
}
,
{
w+−,w
−
−
}
,
{
w+−
}
),
I(
{
w−+,w
−
−
}
,
{
w+−,w
−
−
}
,
{
w−−
}
).
We also have I(Y,X,X∩Y) for each of these four independence judgments
I(X,Y,X ∩Y).
Likewise, B models your full or categorical beliefs:
B(X) iff you believe X.
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Since you believe {w++,w+−} and all of its logical consequences, we have:
B(
{
w++,w
+
−,w
−
+,w
−
−
}
),
B(
{
w++,w
+
−,w
−
+
}
),
B(
{
w++,w
+
−,w
−
−
}
),
B(
{
w++,w
+
−
}
).
Finally, E1/3 models your explicit estimates of truth-values:
Ex(X)
iff
you judge x to be the best estimate of the truth-value of X.
Since you judge 1/3 to be the best estimate of the truth-value of {w++,w−+},
we have:
E1/3
({
w++,w
−
+
})
.
On the pluralist view, your credence function is a measure of your entire
system of attitudes:
A = 〈F ,, I ,B, E1/3〉 .
It is a homomorphism—a structure-preserving mapping—that takes A
into some numerical structure A∗.
A∗ =
〈
R,∗, I∗,B∗, E ∗1/3
〉
.
That is, your credence function c maps F into R in a way that preserves
A’s structure, so that:13
X  Y ⇔ c(X) ∗ c(Y),
I(X,Y,X ∩Y) ⇔ I∗(c(X), c(Y), c(X ∩Y)),
B(X) ⇔ B∗(c(X)),
E1/3(X) ⇔ E ∗1/3(c(X)).
Which numerical structure c takes A into, on the measurement-theoretic
view, is either a matter of convention or a matter to be decided on prac-
tical grounds. For illustrative purposes, let’s choose a familiar numerical
structure. Let ∗ by the “greater than or equal to” relation, ≥. Let I∗ be
the standard probabilistic independence relation:
I∗(c(X), c(Y), c(X ∩Y)) iff c(X)c(Y) = c(X ∩Y).
13 We could swap full agreement for almost, or partial, or strong agreement here. Weaker
notions of agreement would provide us with weaker notions of structure-preservation.
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Let B∗ be a Lockean belief relation, so that believed propositions X have
real-valued proxies c(X) that are greater than (or equal to) some threshold
τ (for concreteness let τ = 5/6):
B∗(c(X)) iff c(X) ≥ τ.
Finally, let E ∗1/3 be:
E ∗1/3(c(X) iff c(X) = 1/3.
This ensures that for any structure-preserving measurement system, c, you
explicitly judge 1/3 to be the best estimate of X’s truth-value just in case
c(X) = 1/3.
The important observation to make is this: the pluralist view carves out
a bigger job for credence functions to do than the reductive view. Credence
functions must do more than preserve the order induced on F by your
comparative belief relation. They must also preserve the structure induced
by your various other doxastic attitudes: your evidential independence
judgments, full or categorical beliefs, and so on. So a function c : F → R
may well do the work required to count as “your credence function” on
the unary view, but yet fall short of that mark on the pluralist view.
Consider, for example, the function b : F → R:
b(
{
w++,w
+
−,w
−
+,w
−
−
}
) = 1, b(
{
w++,w
−
+,w
−
−
}
) = 31/64,
b(
{
w++,w
+
−,w
−
−
}
) = 60/64, b(
{
w++,w
−
−
}
) = 27/64,
b(
{
w++,w
−
+,w
+
−
}
) = 57/64, b(
{
w++,w
−
+
}
) = 24/64,
b(
{
w++,w
+
−
}
) = 53/64, b(
{
w++
}
) = 20/64,
b(
{
w−+,w
+
−,w
−
−
}
) = 44/64, b(
{
w−+,w
−
−
}
) = 11/64,
b(
{
w+−,w
−
−
}
) = 40/64, b(
{
w−−
}
) = 7/64,
b(
{
w−+,w
+
−
}
) = 37/64, b(
{
w−+
}
) = 4/64,
b(
{
w+−
}
) = 33/64, b(∅) = 0.
It is easy to verify that b fully agrees with , i.e.,
X  Y ⇔ b(X) ≥ b(Y).
So b is a real-valued measure of your comparative belief relation . Hence,
it counts as a credence function on the unary measurement-theoretic view.
It preserves the structure on F induced by your comparative beliefs—the
only type of doxastic attitude that the unary view countenances. But it does
not play the theoretical role required to count as a credence function on
the pluralist measurement-theoretic view. To do that, it must also preserve
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the structure on F induced by your various other doxastic attitudes: your
independence judgments, full or categorical beliefs, and so on. But b falls
short of that mark.
For example, you think that the outcome of the first test provides no
evidence about the outcome of the second. But b does not treat {w++,w+−}
and {w++,w−+}, for example, as independent, in the way specified by I∗:
b
({
w++,w
+
−
})
b
({
w++,w
−
+
})
=
53
64
· 24
64
=
159
512
6= 160
512
=
20
64
= b
({
w++
})
.
Similarly, you believe that the first test will come back positive. That is,
you fully believe {w++,w+−}. But b does not treat {w++,w+−} as believed, in
the way specified by the Lockean belief relation B∗. It maps {w++,w+−} to
a real-valued proxy b({w++,w+−}) = 53/64 ≈ 0.828 below the threshold
τ = 5/6 ≈ 0.833 required for full or categorical belief.
Finally, you judge 1/3 to be the best estimate of the truth-value of
the proposition that the second test will come back positive. You have a
judgmental probability of 1/3 for the proposition {w++,w−+}. But b fails
to map {w++,w−+} to the real-valued proxy set aside by E ∗1/3 for such
propositions, viz., 1/3. Instead, b({w++,w−+}) = 24/64 = 0.375.
The upshot: while b preserves the structure on F induced by your com-
parative beliefs, it fails to preserve the additional structure induced by your
various other doxastic attitudes: your evidential independence judgments,
full or categorical beliefs, and so on. So while b does count as one of your
(infinitely many) credence functions on the unary measurement-theoretic
view, it does not count as one on the pluralist measurement-theoretic view.
In contrast, the function c : F → R of Figure 6 counts as “your credence
function” on both the unary and pluralist views. (The interested reader
may verify this for herself.)
To recap: the measurement-theoretic view stakes out a particular posi-
tion on the theoretical role R that a function c (or set of functions C) must
play in order to count as “your credal state.” It says that c (or C) must
fully agree (or almost agree, or partially agree, or strongly agree) with
your comparative and qualitative opinions—comparative beliefs, eviden-
tial independence judgments, full or categorical beliefs, etc.—in the way
required to count as a numerical measure of that entire system of attitudes.
The better c (or C) plays this role R, the more eligible it is as a credal state
candidate. On the unary measurement-theoretic view, the fundamental
type of doxastic attitude is comparative belief. So credal states are numerical
measures of comparative beliefs. On the pluralist measurement-theoretic
view, you have a genuine plurality of doxastic attitudes. So credal states
are numerical measures of a more highly structured system of attitudes.
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{
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,
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}
) =
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, c(∅) = 0.
Figure 6: Credence function c
To streamline our discussion, we will focus on the the unary variant of
the measurement-theoretic view going forward.
5.3 The Characterisation and Normative Questions
How does the unary measurement-theoretic account answer the charac-
terisation question? When exactly is there a function c (or set C) that fully
agrees (or almost agrees, or partially agrees, or strongly agrees) with your
comparative belief relation  in the way required to count as a numerical
measure of ?
We explored a partial answer to this question earlier. Scott (1964) proves
that there is a probability function that fully agrees with your comparative
belief relation  just in case  satisfies Non-Triviality, Non-Negativity,
Totality, and Isovalence. Rios Insua (1992) and Alon and Lehrer (2014)
prove that there is a set of probability functions that fully agrees with 
just in case  satisfies Reflexivity, Non-negativity, Non-triviality, and the
Generalised Finite-Cancellation axiom. Kraft et al. (1959) proves that there
is a probability function that almost agrees with  just in case it satisfies
Almost-Cancellation. Adams (1965) and Fishburn (1969) prove that there
is a probability function that partially agrees with  just in case it satisfies
Partial-Cancellation. Finally, in proving the Generalised Scott Theorem, we
identified sufficient conditions for the existence of a probability function
that strongly agrees with : Non-Triviality, Non-Negativity, and Isovalence.
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Pinning down necessary and sufficient conditions for strong representabil-
ity is an open problem.
These representation theorems tell us what it takes to count as having
probabilistically coherent credences, on the measurement-theoretic view. But
they do not answer the more general characterisation question: when is
your comparative belief relation sufficiently well-behaved for you to count
as having credences full stop, coherent or not?
Krantz et al. (1971) provide an answer. They show that a comparative
belief relation  fully agrees with a real-valued function c if and only if
 is a weak order, i.e.,  satisfies Transitivity and Totality (Krantz et al.,
1971, p. 15, Theorem 1). So if a real-valued function c counts as a structure-
preserving numerical measure of  just in case c fully agrees with ,
and if precise credence functions just are structure-preserving numerical
measures of , then we now know exactly when you count as having
precise credences full stop. You count as having precise credences just in
case  satisfies Transitivity and Totality.
Weaker notions of agreement set weaker standards for “structure preser-
vation.” They thereby make it easier for a real-valued function (or set
of functions) to count as a structure-preserving numerical measurement
system for . In turn, your comparative beliefs need not satisfy such
strict constraints for you to count as having credences. For example, every
comparative belief relation  almost agrees with a real-valued function c.
So if all that is required for structure-preservation is almost-agreement,
then nothing whatsoever is required of  for you to count as having cre-
dences. Any comparative belief relation will do. More interestingly, 
strongly agrees with a real-valued function c if and only if  satisfies weak
transitivity (see the appendix for proof).14
Weak Transitivity. If X  Y1  . . .  Yn  Z, then X 6≺ Z.
So if structure-preservation requires strong-agreement and nothing more,
then you count as having precise credences just in case  satisfies Weak
Transitivity.
What then of Meacham and Weisberg’s concern? They claim that the
axioms of typical representation theorems for comparative belief are so
demanding that only perfectly rational agents could possibly satisfy them.
So even if those axioms do encode sufficient conditions for having cre-
dences, they are more or less irrelevant for irrational agents like us. They
leave entirely open whether our comparative beliefs are ever well-behaved
enough for us to count as having credences.
But your comparative beliefs need not satisfy the axioms of Scott’s
Theorem (or the Almost-Cancellation axiom, or the Partial-Cancellation
axiom, etc.) for you to count as having credences. Such axioms encode
14 The proof strategy for this theorem is due to Catrin Campbell-Moore.
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necessary and sufficient conditions for having probabilistic credences. Prob-
abilistic credence functions, however, are not the only credence functions
in town. Your comparative beliefs only need to satisfy weaker constraints,
such as Weak Transitivity, to count as having credences tout court. Weak
Transitivity is not nearly as demanding as Scott’s axiom.
It is also worth nothing that even though Scott’s axiom and the like
seem complicated, it is not obvious that they are excessively difficult for
agents like us to satisfy. It may be computationally intensive to run a
diagnostic program which continually checks your comparative beliefs
for violations of Scott’s axiom. And if we had to run such a program
to reliably satisfy Scott’s axiom, then you might well expect that limited
agents like us typically violate it. But no such program is necessary. Nature
is replete with cheap solutions to seemingly computationally intensive
problems. This is one main lesson of the embodied cognition movement
in cognitive science.15 Agents like us might well use computationally
cheap strategies, rather than demanding diagnostic programs, in order to
minimise violations of Scott’s axiom and other coherence constraints.
Meacham and Weisberg also worry that the measurement-theoretic view
and its ilk count the wrong functions as eligible credal state candidates
(Meacham & Weisberg, 2011, p. 5). On the (unary) measurement-theoretic
view, any of the infinitely many numerical measurement systems for 
count as equally eligible credal state candidates. But some clearly are more
eligible than others. For example, suppose that Holmes has opinions about
finitely many propositions, e.g., about whether Moriarty is in London, etc.
Then Holmes is struck on the head. The blow does not change Holmes’
comparative beliefs. He is still more confident that Moriarty is in London
than Paris, and so on. But it does raise his confidence that Moriarty is in
London. Then clearly something has changed about which functions are
the most eligible candidates for counting as Holmes’ credence function.
But on the measurement-theoretic view, nothing at all has changed.
One of two things is going on here. Option 1: the objection tacitly
presupposes that the measurement-theoretic view simply misidentifies the
theoretical role R that a function c (or set C) must play in order to count
as “your credal state.” That is a meaty, substantive debate, and we will
not explore it any further. Option 2: the objection tacitly presupposes that
Holmes makes explicit judgments about the best estimates of truth-values,
or something of the sort. But that assumes pluralism. And the pluralist
15 Consider, for example, the “outfielder’s problem” (Clark, 2015, p. 12). It might seem
miraculous that baseball players manage to catch fly balls if doing so involves: (i) estimating
the position of a ball at various time points; (ii) using this information to estimate the
ball’s trajectory; (iii) calculating where the ball will land on the basis of its trajectory. This
is computationally intensive! Luckily, there is a computationally cheap solution. You can
just move your body in a way that keeps the ball centred in your visual field. This strategy
uses the agent’s body to reduce computational demand.
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measurement-theoretic view simply does not say that any of the infinitely
many numerical measurement systems of Holmes’ comparative beliefs are
equally eligible candidates for counting as Holmes’ credence function.
So much for the characterisation question. How does the unary
measurement-theoretic account answer the normative question? Why
should we expect rational agents to have probabilistically coherent credences?
How we answer the normative question depends on what we say about
structure preservation. If we say, for example, that c must fully agree with
 to count as a structure-preserving numerical measure of , and in turn
count as “your credal state,” then the following argument answers the
normative question.
1. Coherence Constraints. Any rational agent’s comparative belief rela-
tion  satisfies Non-Triviality, Non-negativity, Totality, and Isova-
lence.
2. Theory of Credence. A real-valued function c (or set C) counts as
“your credal state” just in case it is a structure-preserving numerical
measure of , i.e., just in case it plays the “structure-preservation
role” R. And c preserves the structure of  just in case c fully agrees
with .
3. Scott’s Theorem. Relation  satisfies Non-Triviality, Non-negativity,
Totality, and Isovalence if and only if  fully agrees with some
probability function c.
4. Bridge Theorem. If  satisfies Non-Triviality, Non-negativity, Totality,
and Isovalence, then there is some probability function c that plays
role R well enough to count as “your credal state.” (From 2 and 3)
C. Probabilism. Any rational agent has probabilistic credences. (From 1
and 4)
Now, you might quibble with premise 1. You might doubt whether Totality,
for example, encodes a genuine constraint of rationality. In that case,
we might weaken our putative coherence constraints by adopting less
demanding standards for structure preservation. For example, if we say
that structure preservation requires only strong agreement with , rather
than full agreement, then we can offer the following argument.
1∗. Coherence Constraints. Any rational agent’s comparative belief rela-
tion  satisfies Non-Triviality, Non-negativity, and Isovalence.
2∗. Theory of Credence. A real-valued function c (or set C) counts as
“your credal state” just in case it is a structure-preserving numerical
measure of , i.e., just in case it plays the “structure-preservation
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role” R. And c preserves the structure of  just in case c strongly
agrees with .
3∗. Corollary of GST. If  satisfies Non-Triviality, Non-negativity, and
Isovalence, then  strongly agrees with some probability function c.
4∗. Bridge Theorem. If  satisfies Non-Triviality, Non-negativity, and
Isovalence, then there is some probability function c that plays role
R well enough to count as “your credal state.” (From 2∗ and 3∗)
C∗. Probabilism. Any rational agent has probabilistic credences. (From 1∗
and 4∗)
Each type of agreement (full, strong, almost, partial) yields a different
variant of this argument. Whether you find any of them compelling will
depend on (i) which putative coherence constraints you find plausible
or implausible (premise 1), and (ii) what type of agreement is required
for credence functions to play any auxiliary theoretical roles you deem
important (premise 2).
At this point, you might be a bit suspicious. Doesn’t this argument trivi-
alise probabilism? True enough, you might say, the probability functions
outputted by Scott’s theorem are fit to play the “credal state role” R on
measurement-theoretic view. But that is because we reverse engineered
R so that Scott’s theorem outputs exactly the right sorts of functions to
play R! We stipulatively defined R to be the role of preserving the structure
of . Then we stipulatively defined structure-preservation to be a matter
of fully agreeing with . But given these stipulative definitions, it follows
trivially that the probability functions outputted by Scott’s theorem play
R well enough to count as “your credal state.” Probabilism seems less like
a substantive normative thesis, then, and more like a trivial consequence
of stipulative definitions.
This suspicion is doubly off the mark. Firstly, the measurement-theoretic
account of credence puts forward a substantive claim about the principal
theoretical role of credence functions c (and imprecise credal states C). It is
motivated by the thought that our opinions are qualitative. At bottom, we
have opinions like: comparative beliefs, full beliefs, etc. And the best way
to understand the numbers that we use to describe these qualitative atti-
tudes is in exactly the same way that we understand the numbers that we
use to describe length, mass, volume, etc., viz., as numerical measurement
systems. Whether this is right or wrong, it is surely no stipulative definition.
Secondly, as we have already emphasised, representability by a probability
function is strictly stronger than representability by a real-valued function.
Establishing that the stronger axioms (e.g., Scott’s axioms) encode genuine
constraints of rationality, rather than merely the weaker axioms (e.g., Tran-
sitivity and Totality) is non-trivial. As a result, establishing probabilism is
comparative probabilities 319
non-trivial, even if we simply grant the measurement theorist her account
of credence.
You might also be concerned that the strategy above only establishes
half of probabilism. If successful, it establishes that all rational agents
have probabilistic credences. But it does not establish that rational agents
have only probabilistic credences. On the measurement-theoretic view, any
agent that counts as having a credence function at all in fact has a plurality
of credence functions. If she is rational, then at least one of these will
be probabilistically coherent. But many will not be. If c is a probability
function that fully agrees with  (or almost agrees, or partially agrees,
or strongly agrees), then any of the infinitely many strictly increasing
transformations of c do so as well. These transformations will not in
general be probability functions.
But this auxiliary thesis—that no rational agent has a probabilisti-
cally incoherent credence function—is not particularly interesting, on
the measurement-theoretic view. The reason: nothing interesting hinges
on whether some incoherent function (or set of functions) is fit to play the
“credal state role” for you. On the measurement-theoretic view, credence
functions are mere numerical measurement systems for comparative belief;
systems which allow you to measure certain parts of an agent’s compara-
tive belief relation  and draw inferences about other parts of . Probabilis-
tic measurement systems are particularly useful for this end. Probability
functions have nice properties; properties that simplify the calculations
necessary to draw inferences about . Whether or not some unhelpful,
incoherent measurement system exists is neither here nor there.16 If some
such system exists, who cares! It’s not hurting anyone. The interesting
question is whether the useful things exist.
But if an agent has incoherent credences, doesn’t this come at some cost
to her? Doesn’t it hurt her? De Finetti (1964) shows that any agent with
incoherent credences is Dutch bookable, i.e., susceptible to sure loss at
the hands of a clever bettor. And Joyce (1998, 2009) shows that any agent
with incoherent credences is accuracy-dominated, i.e., there are distinct
16 Of course, not all incoherent measurement systems are unhelpful. For example, suppose
that b is a probability function and fully agrees with . Let c(X) = eb(X). Then c fully
agrees with . But while b satisfies Finite Additivity:
b(X ∪Y) + b(X ∩Y) = b(X) + b(Y),
c satisfies Finite Multiplicativity:
c(X ∪Y) · c(X ∩Y) = c(X) · c(Y).
Note, though, that c is no less “helpful” than b. All of the theorems of probability theory
can be rewritten in terms of a multiplicative scale rather than an additive scale. So c could
be used to facilitate inference about  just as well as b. For analogous remarks regarding
additive and mutliplicative measures in physics, see (Krantz et al., 1971, p. 100).
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(coherent) credences that are guaranteed to be closer to the truth than
hers. Aren’t these costs—pragmatic and epistemic—that any agent with
incoherent credences must pay?
No. Not on the measurement-theoretic view. De Finetti assumes that
if c counts as your credence function, then c(X) is both your fair buying
and selling price for a unit gamble on X. But this is simply not so on the
measurement-theoretic view. Credence functions represent your compara-
tive beliefs  in an elegant, easy-to-use, numerical fashion—nothing more,
nothing less. It is simply not the job of a credence function to capture your
fair buying (or selling) prices. We cannot read your fair buying and selling
prices off of c in any straightforward fashion. Indeed, to infer anything
about your betting behaviour from c, we need decision-theoretic norms
that specify how rational comparative beliefs and preferences hang together.
For example, following (Savage, 1954, Section 3.2), we might suggest the
following.
Coherence. If X ≻ Y, then you ought to prefer to stake good
outcomes on X than Y. More carefully, if you strictly prefer
outcome o to o∗, and X ≻ Y, then you ought to strictly prefer
A to B:
A = [o if X, o∗ if ¬X] ,
B = [o if Y, o∗ if ¬Y] .
Moreover, you ought to be willing to sacrifice some small
amount ǫ to exchange A for B.
If you satisfy Coherence, and c fully agrees with , then we can use c to
infer something about your betting behaviour. For example, if c(X) = 0.7
and c(Y) = 0.6, then we can infer that you prefer to let £1 ride on X than
on Y, and would even be willing to pay some small amount to exchange
the first gamble for the second. But we cannot infer that your fair buying
(selling) price for X is £0.7, or that your fair buying (selling) price for Y is
£0.6.
Without this crucial assumption—that credences encode fair buy-
ing/selling prices—we cannot provide a de Finetti-style Dutch book
argument to show that no rational agent has incoherent credences. Having
an incoherent credence function does not mean that you have inco-
herent fair buying/selling prices, and hence does not mean that your
buying/selling prices render you Dutch-bookable.
In a similar fashion, Joyce assumes that if c counts as your credence
function, then c(X) is your best estimate of X’s truth-value. Moreover, the
accuracy of these estimates is what makes your doxastic state better or
worse from the epistemic perspective. (Accuracy is the principal source of
epistemic value, anyway.) But again, this is not so on the measurement-
theoretic view. Credence functions are mere numerical measures of com-
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parative belief relations. It is simply not the job of a credence function to
capture your best estimates of truth values, on the measurement-theoretic
view. The upshot: having an incoherent credence function does not mean
that you in any sense have incoherent truth-value estimates; so it does not
mean having accuracy-dominated truth-value estimates; so it does not mean
having a doxastic state that is epistemic-value-dominated.
Finally, one might level a criticism similar to Meacham and Weisberg’s
(2011, pp. 19–20) criticism of Lyle Zynda. Zynda is a proponent of the
unary measurement-theoretic account (Zynda, 2000, pp. 66–68).17 On
Zynda’s view, there are comparative beliefs—agents are more confident
in some propositions than others—but there are no additional modes or
types of doxastic judgment. To the extent that we countenance talk of fully
believing a proposition, or believing something much more strongly than
something else, this better ultimately reduce to talk about comparative
beliefs.
Meacham and Weisberg object that comparative beliefs lack the structure
required to explain everything about choice and inference that we would
like to explain. So even if the measurement theorist provides some reason
to expect rational agents to have probabilistic credences, the background
picture of the basic stock of doxastic attitudes available to such agents is
too impoverished for their arguments to cut much ice.
For example, if we buy the unary measurement-theoretic account, then
the well-known problem of interpersonal utility comparisons rears its
head as a problem of interpersonal credal comparisons. Just as it makes
no sense to say that Ashan desires chocolate ice cream more strongly
than Bilal does, on the measurement-theoretic account (since there is
no common scale one which their preferences are measured), similarly
it makes no sense to say that Ashan is more confident that it will rain
than Bilal is. But, at least in certain cases, it seems that we need such
facts to explain choice behaviour. Why did Ashan grab his umbrella but
Bilal did not? One possible explanation: both are more confident than
not that it will rain, but Ashan is more confident than Bilal. On the the
unary measurement-theoretic account, such explanations are unavailable,
Meacham and Weisberg argue. More generally:
the extra-ordinal structure contained in the standard Bayesian
picture of degrees of belief is not idle. Magnitudes encode im-
portant features of our degrees of belief, and if we abandon this
structure, degrees of belief lose much of their utility. (Meacham
& Weisberg, 2011, p. 20)
17 Like Maher, Zynda subscribes to the thesis of the primacy of practical reason (cf., Zynda
2000, p. 55). Credence functions are numerical measures of comparative beliefs. But
preferences are the real thing. Comparative beliefs reduce to preferences.
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You might not think that there is much to this line of criticism. For
example, Ashan might think that rain is just as likely as picking a black
ball at random from an urn containing 99 black balls and 1 white ball. Bilal,
in contrast, might think that rain is just as likely as picking a black ball at
random from an urn containing 51 black balls and 49 white balls.18 These
individual comparative belief facts help to explain why Ashan grabbed his
umbrella but Bilal did not at least as well as the purported interpersonal
fact that Ashan is more confident than Bilal. It is not obvious, then, that
there is any genuine problem of interpersonal credal comparisons to
resolve.
Even if you do think there is something to this line of criticism, note
that it is not an objection to the measurement-theoretic account of cre-
dence per se. It is only an objection to the unary measurement-theoretic
account. A pluralist faces no such problems. Of course, in answering the
normative question, a pluralist cannot simply appeal to Scott’s theorem.
Scott’s theorem only shows that comparative belief relations with certain
properties are probabilistically representable. The pluralist must appeal
to a representation theorem that shows that a more comprehensive system of
doxastic attitudes with certain properties is probabilistically representable.
But there is no principled reason for thinking that such representation
theorems are not forthcoming.
6 evaluating the decision-theoretic view
On the decision-theoretic view, the principal theoretical role of an agent’s
credal state is to encode her fair buying and selling prices. Recall, an
agent’s fair buying price for a gamble G is the largest amount B(G) that
she could pay for G without making herself worse off. She pays B(G),
receives G, and is no worse than the status quo, in her own view. Her fair
selling price for G is the smallest amount S(G) that someone else would
have to pay her in exchange for G to avoid being worse off. She receives
S(G), commits to shelling out G’s payoff, and is no worse than the status
quo, in her own view.
Gambles are measurable quantities G : Ω → R. For simplicity, we will
assume that |Ω| = n, and treat gambles as vectors in Rn. When we model
a gamble as a vector
G = 〈g1, . . . , gn〉 ,
18 Both de Finetti (1931) and Koopman (1940a) use “partition axioms” to extract quantitative
information from belief relations in roughly this way. For a recent approach along these
lines, see Elliott (2018). You might also model agents as having comparative estimation
relations, as explored in §2.3. Comparative estimation relations allow for a much richer
and explanatorily powerful set of doxastic attitudes than comparative belief relations.
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we do so by specifying the net effect gi that the gamble has on our agent’s
level of total wealth in world wi. For example, suppose you let £100 ride
on red at the roulette table. Let w1, . . . ,wi be the worlds in which the ball
lands on red (you net £100), and wi+1, . . . ,wn be the worlds in which it
does not (you net −£100). Then we model your gamble as follows:
G =
〈
100, . . . , 100︸ ︷︷ ︸
i times
,−100, . . . ,−100︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n-i) times
〉
.
For any proposition X ∈ F , we model a unit gamble on X by the
characteristic vector x = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 of X, i.e., the vector with xi = 1
if wi ∈ X and xi = 0 if wi 6∈ X. And for any a ∈ R, we model the
“constant gamble” that pays out £a in every world by the constant vector
a = 〈a, . . . , a〉.
Following Walley (1991), we can specify an agent’s fair buying and
selling prices using sets of almost-desirable gambles. Say that a gamble G
is almost desirable for an agent iff she weakly prefers G to 〈0, . . . , 0〉, i.e.,
the status quo. Let D ⊆ Rn be the set of gambles that she finds almost
desirable.
Now we can specify her fair buying and selling price for G (B(G) and
S(G), respectively) in terms of D. Let
B(G) = sup {a | G − a ∈ D} .
Taking the gamble G − a is equivalent to paying £a for G. So B(G) is the
largest amount that she could pay for G while leaving herself in a position
that she weakly prefers to the status quo, i.e., her fair buying price for G.
Likewise, let
S(G) = inf {a | a− G ∈ D} .
Taking the gamble a− G is equivalent to receiving £a and shelling out
G’s payoff. So S(G) is the smallest amount that someone else would have
to pay her in exchange for G while leaving herself in a position that she
weakly prefers to the status quo, i.e., her fair selling price for G.
Talk of both fair buying and fair selling prices is actually a bit redundant.
Note that
−B(−G) = − sup {a | −G − a ∈ D}
= inf
{−a | −G − a ∈ D}
= inf
{
a | −G + a ∈ D}
= S(G).
Taking −G from someone (they shell out −G’s payoff to you) is nothing
more than you offering G to them (you shell out G’s payoff to them). And
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paying a negative amount to someone for some good is really nothing more
than them paying you a positive amount (and vice versa: taking a negative
amount is nothing more than you paying a positive amount). The smaller
the positive amount that they pay you, the bigger the negative amount
you pay them. So the negative of the biggest amount that you would pay
to take −G, i.e., −B(−G), is just another way of describing the smallest
amount that you would need to be paid to offer G.
We will just talk of your fair buying prices henceforth. But these really
capture both your fair buying and selling prices.
Say that a set E of real-valued functions e : Rn → R encodes your fair
buying prices iff its lower envelope for G,
E [G] = inf {e(G) | e ∈ E} ,
is equal to B(G) when B(G) is defined, and is undefined when it is not. Say
that a set of probability functions C encodes your fair buying prices just in
case its corresponding set of expectation operators EC =
{
Ec | c ∈ C
}
does
so:
EC [G] = inf
{
Ec[G] | c ∈ C
}
.
Finally, say that your fair buying prices are probabilistic iff some set of
probability functions encodes them.
How does the decision-theoretic account answer the characterisation
question? When exactly is there a real-valued function c (or a set of such
functions C) that encodes your fair buying and selling prices? Answer:
always.
Say that a real-valued function e : Rn → R dominates your fair buying
prices iff e(G) ≥ B(G) whenever B(G) is defined. Let E ∗ be the set of
real-valued functions that dominate your fair buying prices, i.e.,
E ∗ = {e | e(G) ≥ B(G) if B(G) is defined} .
Then E ∗ encodes your fair buying prices, whatever they are. Hence E ∗
counts as “your credal state” according to the decision-theoretic view.
So there are no demanding constraints that an agent must satisfy in
order to have credences, on this view. Having credences is dead easy. And
clearly it is perfectly possible to have non-probabilistic credences.
So much for the characterisation question. How does the decision-
theoretic account answer the normative question? Why should we expect
rational agents to have probabilistic credences?
The story here is considerably more tricky. One might expect standard
Dutch book arguments to provide an answer. De Finetti (1964) shows that
for a specific sort of agent—one whose fair buying prices are equal to
her fair selling prices, i.e., B(G) = S(G)—having non-probabilistic fair
buying prices renders you Dutch bookable (susceptible to sure loss at
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the hands of a clever bettor). One can see essentially the same result by
considering (Walley, 1991, 3.3.3a). Walley shows that an agent’s fair buying
prices are not Dutch bookable (avoid sure loss) iff they are dominated by
the expectation operator of some probability function. And in the special
case under consideration—fair buying prices equal fair selling prices—
one’s fair buying prices are dominated in this way just in case they are
probabilistic, i.e., encoded by some set of probabilities C. The upshot: in
this special case—fair buying prices equal fair selling prices—an agent is
not Dutch bookable (avoids sure loss) iff there is some set of probabilities C
that encodes her fair buying prices, and hence counts as “her credal state.”
So if rationality requires avoiding sure loss, then we have good reason to
expect this very special kind of agent to have probabilistic credences.
You might hope, then, that such a Dutch book argument could show
quite generally that rational agents have probabilistic credences. But your
hopes would be in vain. An agent avoids sure loss iff there is some set
of probabilities C whose expectations for gambles uniformly dominate
her fair buying prices for those gambles, i.e., Ec[G] ≥ B(G) for all c ∈ C
and all gambles G. When an agent’s fair buying and selling prices come
apart, this can happen even when there is no set of probabilities C∗ that
actually encodes her fair buying prices.19 Bottom line: non-Dutch-book-
ability (avoiding sure loss) does not require having probabilistic credences.
Having probabilistic credences, in the decision-theoretic sense (i.e., some
set of probabilities that encodes your fair buying prices), is equivalent to
something stronger than non-Dutch-book-ability—what Walley calls “co-
herence.” Your fair buying prices are coherent iff they satisfy the following
axioms.
1. Accept Sure Gains. B(G) ≥ infG.
2. Homogeneity. B(λG) = λB(G) for λ ≥ 0.
3. Superlinearity. B(G + G∗) ≥ B(G) + B(G∗).
Axiom 1 forbids you from paying at most £1 for G when G is guaranteed
to payoff either £2, £3, or £4, for example. It says that your maximum
buying price for G must be at least £2. Axiom 2 says that your fair buying
price for a gamble G that is guaranteed to pay 2 (or 10, or 58.97) times
another gamble G∗ should be 2 (or 10, or 58.97) times your fair buying
price for G∗. Axiom 3 says that your fair buying price for a package of bets
19 Consider, for example, an agent whose fair buying price for any gamble G is infG − ǫ. For
any non-constant G , B(G) = infG − ǫ < supG − ǫ = − inf−G − ǫ < − inf−G + ǫ = S(G).
But clearly B[G] < EC [G] for any set of probability functions C. So the lower envelope of
EC dominates her fair buying prices. Hence she avoids sure loss. But no such C encodes her
fair buying prices.
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should be at least as great as the sum of your fair buying prices for each
of the bets in the package.
To reiterate: coherence is strictly stronger than avoiding sure loss. Walley
(1991, Section 2.4) provides examples of fair buying prices that avoid sure
loss (are not Dutch bookable), but nevertheless are not coherent. (Every
coherent set of fair buying prices, in contrast, avoids sure loss.) So Dutch
book or sure loss considerations do not give us good reason to think that,
quite generally, rational agents have probabilistic credences.
All is not lost, though. Even if Dutch books arguments don’t do the
trick, another argument might. For example, in the spirit of Icard (2016)
and Fishburn (1986, p. 338), we might propose constraints of rationality
governing how one’s comparative beliefs and preferences, or judgments of
almost-desirability, ought to hang together. In particular, we might suggest
that the set D of gambles that an agent finds almost desirable (i.e., that she
weakly prefers to the status quo) ought to be exactly the set D of gambles
that are almost desirable relative to her comparative belief relation .
Belief-Preference Coherence. D = D.
Recall, a gamble G is almost desirable relative to  iff it is a non-negative
linear combination of components
(X1 −Y1), . . . , (Xn −Yn)
which are such that Xi  Yi. G is a non-negative linear combination of
(X1 −Y1), . . . , (Xn −Yn) just in case
G = ∑
i
λi(Xi −Yi)
for some λ1, . . . ,λn ≥ 0.
The basic thought here is this. Xi − Yi is the gamble that pays out £1
if Xi is true and −£1 if Yi is true. You ought to weakly prefer this to the
status quo iff you are at least as confident that Xi is true as Yi. Moreover,
you ought to think that any package of such bets, even if their stakes are
scaled up or down by a positive constant, is almost-desirable; you ought
to weakly prefer it to the status quo. And nothing more. Your comparative
beliefs give you no reason to determinately prefer any other gamble to the
status quo.
Now suppose that rationality not only demands comparative beliefs and
preferences hang together as per Belief-Preference Coherence, but that it
also demands that comparative beliefs on their own satisfy the Generalised
Finite-Cancellation axiom.
Generalised Finite-Cancellation. If
X1 + . . .+ Xn + A+ . . .+ A︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
= Y1 + . . .+Yn + B+ . . .+ B︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
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and Xi  Yi for all i ≤ n, then A  B.
Perhaps pragmatic considerations other than Dutch book or sure loss
considerations establish that rational comparative beliefs satisfy GFC.20
Or perhaps epistemic considerations establish this. Perhaps, for example,
comparative beliefs that satisfy GFC epistemic-utility-dominate ones that
do not, or something of the sort. For now, let’s just leave an IOU for the
justification of GFC.
Supposing that rational comparative beliefs satisfy GFC, we can now
provide some reason to think that quite generally rational agents have
probabilistic credences.
1. Coherence Constraints. Any rational agent’s comparative beliefs sat-
isfy GFC. Moreover, her comparative beliefs and preferences, or
judgments of almost-desirability, jointly satisfy Belief-Preference Co-
herence.
2. Theory of Credence. A set of real-valued functions C count as “your
credal state” just in case they encode your fair buying prices.
3. IP-Representability Theorem. Relation  satisfies GFC iff  is IP-
representable, i.e.,  fully agrees with some set of probability func-
tions C.
4. Bridge Theorem. If  is IP-representable and satisfies Belief-Preference
Coherence, then the maximal set of probability functions C∗ that
fully agrees with  also encodes your fair buying prices, and hence
counts as “your credal state.” (Premise 2, Appendix)
C. Probabilism. Any rational agent has probabilistic credences. (From 1,
3, and 4)
Does this argument trivialise probabilism? Of course not. It relies on the
decision-theoretic account of credence—a substantive, highly non-trivial
thesis. Moreover, even if we simply grant the decision-theoretic account of
credence, it is no trivial consequence that rational agents have probabilistic
credences. Having credences is easy. You have credences whatever your
fair-buying prices are. But having probabilistic credences requires satisfying
some demanding axioms (Belief-Preference Coherence, GFC). Establishing
that these axioms encode genuine constraints of rationality is non-trivial.
As a result, establishing probabilism is non-trivial.
20 Icard (2016) shows that an agent who satisfies Belief-Preference Coherence avoids sure loss
iff her comparative beliefs are strongly representable. Strong representability is weaker
than GFC. So we need something other than sure loss considerations to show that rational
comparative beliefs satisfy GFC.
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You might be concerned that our little argument only establishes half
of probabilism. It shows that rational agents have probabilistic credences.
But it does not show that rational agents have only probabilistic credences.
Indeed, it cannot do so. We gave a recipe earlier for constructing a credal
state for any agent. Just take the set of real-valued functions that dominate
her fair buying prices. This set will encode those prices, and so count
as “her credal state,” on the decision-theoretic view. But it is not a set of
probability functions.
But this converse thesis—viz., that for any rational agent, no set of real-
valued functions with non-probabilistic members counts as “her credal
state”—is not theoretically interesting, on the decision-theoretic view. The
benefits of having probabilistic credences (avoiding sure loss, coherence)
accrue to any agent whose fair buying prices are encoded by some set of
probabilities. Whether or not some non-probabilistic set encodes them as
well is neither here nor there. Nothing of theoretical import hangs on it.
Finally, you might once again complain that the decision-theoretic ac-
count presupposes that rational agents only have comparative beliefs; no
additional modes or types of doxastic judgment. But this stock of basic
doxastic attitudes is too sparse. It is insufficient to explain everything
about choice and inference that we would like to explain. So arguments
that presuppose it are weak.
A similar response to the one in Section 5 will suffice. There is good
reason to think this criticism lacks punch. And even if you buy the criticism,
it is not an objection to the decision-theoretic account of credence per se.
It is only an objection to the unary variant of this account. A pluralist
faces no such problems. Of course, a pluralist must say more about how
other types of doxastic attitudes—not just comparative beliefs—ought
to hang together with judgments of almost-desirability. In addition, she
must provide a more sophisticated IP-representability theorem and bridge
theorem. But these are not in-principle problems. They are requests to
cash in an IOU.
What does the scorecard look like? Whether the decision-theoretic ac-
count provides a compelling answer to the normative question depends
in part on whether those IOUs can be replaced by theorems. But there is
no special reason to think this task cannot be done. In addition, epistemic
utility theorists, e.g., Joyce (1998, 2009) and Pettigrew (2016), worry that
this story provides an incomplete picture of our reasons to have proba-
bilistic credences. A complete picture would provide a purely epistemic
rationale for having imprecise credences.21 Nevertheless, some form of the
argument presented here might help illuminate some of our reasons for
having probabilistic credences.
21 Epistemic utility theorists get off the boat early by rejecting the decision-theoretic account
of credence.
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7 evaluating the epistemic interpretivist view
On the epistemic interpretivist view, a function (or set of functions) counts
as “your credal state” just in case it encodes truth-value estimates that
best rationalise or make sense of your comparative beliefs, understood as
irreducibly-doxastic attitudes.
More formally, a function c : F → R (or a set of such functions C)
counts as “your credal state” iff its truth-value estimates best rationalise
your comparative beliefs  (or on the pluralist version: your comparative
and qualitative opinions more generally). For c (or C) to best rationalise
, it must satisfy two conditions: (i) c must recommend  as strongly
as possible, so that no other c∗ (or set C∗) recommends  to a higher
degree; (ii) c must be closer to rational (closer to the set T of rational
assignments of truth-value estimates) than any other c∗ that recommends
 as strongly as possible—this ensures that c provides the highest quality
recommendation possible.
To illustrate this view, consider two concrete cases. In case 1, you have
comparative beliefs over propositions in the following Boolean algebra:
F = {∅, {w1} , {w2} , {w1,w2}} .
In particular, your comparative beliefs are given by:
∅ ≺ {w1} ≺ {w2} ≺ {w1,w2} .
Question: which function c (or set C) encodes truth-value estimates (or con-
straints on estimates) that best rationalise your comparative beliefs , and
hence counts as “your credal state,” according to epistemic interpretivism?
To provide a concrete answer, we will need to make a few substantive
assumptions about recommendation, rationality, and the like.
In Section 3.3, we outlined three accounts of recommendation—the
metaphysical, normative, and epistemic utility accounts—which aim to
explain when and how an assignment of truth-value estimates c (or set of
assignments C) recommends comparative beliefs  more or less strongly.
For simplicity, we will assume the metaphysical account in what follows.
Recall, on the metaphysical account, c (or C) recommends  as strongly
as possible just in case explicitly judging c (or C) to encode the best
(constraints on) estimates of truth-values metaphysically entails having pre-
cisely the comparative beliefs given by . Moreover, we will assume that
judging c to be best entails having a specific set of comparative beliefs,
viz., the comparative beliefs c that fully agree with c. Likewise, we will
assume that judging a set of assignments C (constraints on truth-value
estimates) to be best entails having the comparative beliefs C that fully
agree with C. Finally, we will assume that the set T of rational assignments
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of truth-value estimates is fairly inclusive. In particular, we will adopt the
radical subjective Bayesian assumption that T is the set of probability func-
tions. Likewise, the rational constraints on truth-value estimates (imprecise
truth-value estimates) are just the sets of probability functions.
Back to our question then. Which function c (or set C) encodes (con-
straints on) truth-value estimates that best rationalise your comparative
beliefs , and hence counts as “your credal state,” according to epistemic
interpretivism?
Firstly, note that any probability function c with 0.5 < c({w2}) < 1 is
such that
c(∅) < c({w1}) < c({w2}) < c({w1,w2}),
and hence fully agrees with . So any such c recommends  as strongly
as possible, on the metaphysical account. Secondly, note that each such
a c is probabilistically coherent. So it is maximally rational, according
to our radical subjective Bayesian assumption. Hence any of these prob-
ability functions counts as “your credal state,” according to epistemic
interpretivism.
Similarly, note that any set of probability functions C with 0.5 <
c({w2}) < 1 for all c ∈ C fully agrees with . So any such C recommends
 as strongly as possible, on the metaphysical account. And each such
C is maximally rational, according to our radical subjective Bayesian
assumption. So any of these sets of probability functions C counts as “your
credal state,” according to epistemic interpretivism.
On a pluralist version of epistemic interpretivism, according to which
your credal state does not simply best rationalise your comparative beliefs,
but rather best rationalises a broader set of comparative and qualitative opin-
ions, we might be able to winnow down the set of candidate credal states
more than this. Likewise, on a more sophisticated version of epistemic
interpretivism according to which your credal state does not simply best
rationalise your current opinions, but rather is part of a package that best
rationalises your opinions over time, we might be able to winnow down
this set even further. But as it stands, epistemic interpretivism allows for a
lot of slack in what counts as your credences. It allows for a great many
ties between maximally eligible credal states. This, however, is as it should
be. Given what epistemic interpretivists take the principle theoretical role
of credal states to be—their job is to best rationalise your comparative
and qualitative opinions—and given how few comparative beliefs you
actually have, various sets of truth-value estimates (and constraints on
such estimates) play that role equally well.
Consider one more concrete case. In case 2, your comparative beliefs are
given by:
∅ ≈ {w1} ≈ {w2} ≺ {w1,w2} .
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Which function c (or set C) encodes (constraints on) truth-value estimates
that best rationalise your comparative beliefs , and hence counts as “your
credal state,” according to epistemic interpretivism?
To answer this question, first note that your comparative belief relation
is clearly not probabilistically representable. No probability function fully
agrees with . Nor is it imprecisely representable. So no probability
function c, or set of probability functions C, recommends  as strongly
as possible. But there are non-probabilistic assignments of truth-value
estimates that fully agree with , and hence recommend it as strongly
as possible. In particular, any c with c(∅) = c({w1}) = c({w2}) = x,
c({w1,w2}) = y and x < y is such that
c(∅) = c({w1}) = c({w2}) < c({w1,w2}),
and hence fully agrees with . So any such c recommends  as strongly
as possible, on the metaphysical account.
But which one of these provides the highest quality recommendation of
? That is, which one is closest to rational? Since the rational assignments
of truth-value estimates are exactly the probability functions (by assump-
tion), the question really is: which of these assignments of truth-value
estimates is closest to probabilistically coherent (i.e., closest to the set of
all probability functions)?
To answer this question, we need to plump for some measure of “close-
ness” or “proximity.” One natural choice: squared Euclidean distance.
Squared Euclidean distance is the “Bregman divergence” generated by a
very popular measure of accuracy, viz., the Brier Score. It captures one at-
tractive way of thinking about how close two sets of truth-value estimates
are in terms of how similar their degree of accuracy is expected to be. If
we plump for squared Euclidean distance as our measure of “closeness”
or “proximity,” then the assignment of truth-value estimates that best
rationalises your comparative beliefs is given by:
c(∅) = c({w1}) = c({w2}) = 1/3,
c({w1,w2}) = 1.
So this function c counts as “your credal state,” according to epistemic
interpretivism. What’s more, assuming that supersets {c, c∗, . . .} of {c}
with the c∗ all strictly less rational than c are themselves less rational than
{c}, we have that c is the unique function that counts as “your credal state.”
So much for the nuts and bolts of epistemic interpretivism. What about
the characterisation question? When exactly is there a real-valued function
c (or a set of such functions C) that encodes truth-value estimates which
best rationalise your comparative beliefs, and hence counts as “your credal
state”?
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It depends. It depends which account of recommendation you plump
for. It depends which assignments of truth-value estimates you count as
rational. It depends how you measure proximity to the set of rational as-
signments of truth-value estimates. Different commitments on these fronts
will yield different answers to the question of which truth-value estimates
rationalise which comparative beliefs. But for concreteness, suppose we
stick with the metaphysical account and radical subjective Bayesian as-
sumption we made earlier. In that case, whenever your comparative beliefs
 fully agree with a real-valued function c, that function will recommend
 as strongly as possible. So some such function will best rationalise  (or
near enough).22 And a comparative belief relation  fully agrees with a
real-valued function c if and only if  satisfies Transitivity and Totality
(Krantz et al., 1971, Theorem 1). So some real-valued function c best ratio-
nalises , and hence counts as “your credal state,” whenever  satisfies
Transitivity and Totality.
Conversely, if violates either Transitivity or Totality, then no single real-
valued function fully agrees with . Hence no single function recommends
 as strongly as possible. If there is some set of real-valued functions that
fully agrees with , then that set recommends  more strongly than any
single function, on the metaphysical view. So while no single function will
count as “your credal state,” some set (the most rational one that fully
agrees with ) will do so (or near enough). It is an interesting question
when exactly there is such a set of functions (not necessarily probability
functions) that fully agrees with .
The overarching lesson here is a familiar one. Your comparative beliefs
need not satisfy Scott’s axioms—axioms which might seem rather demand-
ing on their face—in order to count as having credences, according to
epistemic interpretivism. Given our working assumptions (the metaphysi-
cal account, etc.), such axioms encode necessary and sufficient conditions
for having precise probabilistic credences. But it is perfectly possible to
have non-probabilistic credences. As we saw in case 2, if your comparative
beliefs are given by
∅ ≈ {w1} ≈ {w2} ≺ {w1,w2} ,
then the following non-probabilistic real-valued function c counts as “your
credal state,” according to the epistemic interpretivist:
c(∅) = c({w1}) = c({w2}) = 1/3,
c({w1,w2}) = 1.
Your comparative beliefs only need to satisfy relatively weak constraints
to count as having credences tout court.
22 For any ǫ > 0, we can pick some c that recommends  such that any other c∗ that does so
as well is no more than ǫ-closer to coherent.
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On to the normative question then. Why should we expect rational
agents to have probabilistic credences?
The epistemic interpretivist’s answer to the normative question is much
more complicated than our previous accounts’ answers. For the epistemic
interpretivist, the normative question breaks into (at least) three subques-
tions.
1. Why should we expect that for any rational agent, there is some
probability function that fully agrees with her comparative beliefs?
2. Why should we expect it to be the case that the rational assignments
of truth-value estimates are exactly the probability functions?
3. Why should we expect any probability function that fully agrees
with comparative beliefs  to recommend  as strongly as possible?
Scott’s theorem tells us that comparative beliefs  fully agree with
some probability function c iff  satisfies Non-Triviality, Non-negativity,
Totality, and Isovalence. So answering question 1 amounts to defending
the claim that rational comparative beliefs satisfy Non-Triviality, Non-
negativity, Totality, and Isovalence. Of course, you might doubt whether
“structural axioms” like Totality encode genuine constraints of rationality.
In that case, the epistemic interpretivist might defend the Generalised
Finite-Cancellation axiom and argue that rational agents have imprecise
probabilistic credences.
To answer question 2, the epistemic interpretivist might rely on results
from epistemic utility theory. For example, she might endorse an austere
conception of rationality, according to which rationality requires you to
prefer one assignment of truth-value estimates b to another c just in case b
is guaranteed to be more accurate than c. Then she might appeal to Joyce
(1998, 2009), Predd et al. (2009), Schervish, Seidenfeld, and Kadane (2009),
and Pettigrew (2016), who show that any non-probabilistic b is accuracy-
dominated by some probabilistic c, i.e., the truth-value estimates encoded
by c are guaranteed to be more accurate than those encoded by b. No
probabilistic c, in contrast, is even weakly accuracy-dominated. So the
probability functions are exactly the rational assignments of truth-value
estimates (not rationally dispreferred to any other assignment), on the
austere conception of rationality.
Finally, to answer question 3, the epistemic interpretivist must defend
an account of recommendation and various auxiliary claims. For example,
a proponent of the epistemic utility account must defend various substan-
tive claims about the nature of epistemic value. In particular, she must
defend the claim that on any reasonable measure of epistemic utility for
comparative beliefs, all probability functions expect the comparative belief
relations that fully agree with them to have maximal epistemic utility.
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We will not provide answers to questions 1–3 here. But if the epis-
temic interpretivist can answer them satisfactorily, then she can offer up
something like the following argument for probabilism.
1. Coherence Constraints. Any rational agent’s comparative belief rela-
tion  satisfies Non-Triviality, Non-negativity, Totality, and Isova-
lence.
2. Theory of Credence. An assignment of truth-value estimates c counts
as “your credal state” iff it best rationalises your comparative beliefs
. Moreover, c best rationalises  iff (i) it recommends  as strongly
as possible, and (ii) c is itself closer to rational than any other c∗ that
recommends  as strongly as possible.
3. Accuracy Argument. An assignment of truth-value estimates c is ratio-
nal iff c is a probability function. (Accuracy-dominance theorem, austere
conception of rationality)
4. Scott’s Theorem. Relation  satisfies Non-Triviality, Non-negativity,
Totality, and Isovalence if and only if  fully agrees with some
probability function c.
5. Theory of Recommendation. An assignment of truth-value estimates c
recommends  to degree k iff the maximally rational extension of c
to Q, estc, is such that estc(U ()) = k.
6. Bridge Theorem I. If  fully agrees with a probability function c, then
c recommends  as strongly as possible. (Premise 5, austere conception
of rationality, auxiliary assumptions about epistemic utility)
7. Bridge Theorem II. If  fully agrees with a probability function c, then
c not only recommends  as strongly as possible, but is also rational.
Hence c counts as “your credal state.” (From 2, 3 and 6)
C. Probabilism. Any rational agent has probabilistic credences. (From 1,
4 and 7)
Does this argument trivialise probabilism? Obviously not! It is positively
baroque! And unlike the measurement-theoretic and decision-theoretic
accounts, the epistemic interpretivist can plausibly argue that rational
agents have only probabilistic credences. To see this, suppose that your
comparative beliefs are given by the rational comparative belief relation
. By premise 1,  satisfies Non-Triviality, Non-negativity, Totality, and
Isovalence. So by premises 4 and 7, there is some probability function c
that fully agrees with , and hence best rationalises . Now, while many
non-probabilistic assignments of truth-value estimates b will also fully
agree with , and hence recommend  as strongly as possible, none will
comparative probabilities 335
provide as high a quality recommendation for . Hence none will best
rationalise . The reason: any non-probabilistic b is accuracy-dominated
by some probabilistic c, and hence less rational than c (premise 3). So b
provides a weaker rationale for  than c. Hence b fails to count as “your
credal state,” according to the epistemic interpretivist.
Finally, you might return to the complaint that this account presupposes
that rational agents only have comparative beliefs—an overly austere,
explanatorily deficient stock of doxastic attitudes. But again, this is only
an objection to a unary version of epistemic interpretivism (to the extent
that it has bite at all). It has no force against pluralist variants. Of course,
pluralist variants face a range of unanswered questions. When exactly
does a set of truth-value estimates rationalise a more comprehensive
system of doxastic attitudes (comparative beliefs, full beliefs, opinions
about evidential and causal dependence and independence, etc.)? Why
should we expect reasonable measures of epistemic utility for these more
comprehensive systems to satisfy a suitably generalised version of strict
propriety? And when exactly are these more comprehensive systems
of doxastic attitudes probabilistically representable? But these are new
research questions bubbling up on the boundary of an active research
programme. There is no principled reason for thinking that they do not
have adequate answers.
Before wrapping up, it is worth highlighting one additional virtue of
epistemic intepretivism. At the outset, we mentioned a Bayesian platitude
about credences. Joyce puts the platitude as follows: “in the probabilistic
tradition, the defining fact about credences is that they are used to estimate
quantities that depend on truth-values” (Joyce, 2009, pp. 268–9). A rational
agent’s credences determine expectations of measurable quantities (quanti-
ties like the size of the deficit 10 years hence, or the utility of an outcome),
which capture her best estimates of those quantities. Those best estimates,
in turn, typically rationalise or make sense of her evaluative attitudes and
choice behaviour.
Shorter: credences capture estimates that provide rationalising explana-
tions.
Epistemic interpretivism is much better positioned than the measure-
ment-theoretic or decision-theoretic views to vindicate this platitude. On
the measurement-theoretic view, credence functions are just mappings
from propositions to real numbers that preserve the structure of your
comparative beliefs. They do not encode estimates, or any other quantity
that might plausibly play a role in rationalising your doxastic attitudes,
evaluative attitudes, or choice behaviour. On the decision-theoretic view,
credence functions are just numerical systems that encode your fair buying
and selling prices. But having fair buying and selling prices is nothing over
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and above having certain kinds of preferences. So they are hardly fit to
rationalise preferences.23
In contrast, epistemic interpretivism directly identifies your credence
function c with the assignment of truth-value estimates that best ratio-
nalises your comparative beliefs . And however we spell out what it is for
truth-value estimates to best rationalise comparative beliefs, we can apply
a similar story to preferences and choice behaviour. Consider, for example,
the epistemic utility account of recommendation from Section 3.3. On this
view, we start with c, and we add estimates of other measurable quantities
Q to the stock of truth-value estimates encoded by c in the most rational
way possible. In particular, we add estimates of the epistemic utility of
comparative belief relations. The larger the estimate of ’s epistemic utility,
the more strongly c recommends .
We can tell exactly the same story about how your credences rationalise
preferences and choice behaviour. We start with the truth-value estimates
c that best rationalise your comparative beliefs, and we add estimates of
the value of actions, for example, in the most rational way possible. The
larger the estimate of an action’s value, the more strongly c recommends
it. In turn, the more strongly it rationalises choosing that action.
The moral: epistemic interpretivism appears to have the resources to
vindicate core tenets of Bayesianism that other accounts have trouble with.
8 concluding remarks
Many Bayesians take comparative belief to be crucial for spelling out what it
is to have a degree of confidence, or degree of belief, or credence. And they
typically appeal to representation theorems when answering foundational
questions about credence. We have explored three different accounts—
measurement-theoretic, decision-theoretic, and epistemic interpretivist—
that utilise comparative beliefs and representation theorems in order to
answer two such questions: the characterisation question, i.e., when exactly
an agent counts as having credences, and the normative question, i.e., why
we should expect rational agents to have probabilistic credences. Hájek
(2009), Meacham and Weisberg (2011), and Titelbaum (2015) pose some
pressing challenges to accounts of this sort: they make the bar for having
credences so high that very few real agents clear it, they trivialise probabil-
ism, and so on. But we found that suitably sophisticated versions of each of
our three accounts handle these challenges fairly well. There is more work
to be done in filling these accounts out. But wholesale scepticism about
the role of comparative belief and representation theorems in providing
an account of credence seems premature.
23 For a similar criticism of behaviourism, see Joyce (1999, Section 1.3).
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9 appendix
Choose any comparative belief structure 〈Ω,F ,〉 with finite F . Assume
without loss of generality that |Ω| = n.
Theorem 1 (Generalised Scott’s Theorem) Suppose  satisfies the follow-
ing two conditions.
1. Non-triviality. Ω ≻ ∅.
2. Non-negativity. X  ∅.
Then the following two conditions are equivalent.
3. Isovalence. If X1+ . . .+Xn = Y1+ . . .+Yn and Xi  Yi for all i ≤ n,
then Xi  Yi for all i ≤ n as well.
4. Strong representability. There exists a probability function p : F →
R that strongly agrees with  in the sense that:
(i) X  Y ⇒ p(X) ≥ p(Y),
(ii) X ≻ Y ⇒ p(X) > p(Y).
Proof. Let
A =
{
∑
i
λi(Xi −Yi) | λi ≥ 0 and Xi  Yi
}
and
U =
{
∑
i
λi(Yi − Xi) | λi ≥ 0, ∑
i
λi = 1, and Xi ≻ Yi
}
.
First we will show that A ∩U = ∅ iff  satisfies Isovalence. Then we
will show that if  satisfies Non-Triviality and Non-Negativity, then
A ∩U = ∅ iff  is strongly representable.
Suppose that  satisfies Isovalence. So if
X1 + . . .+ Xt = Y1 + . . .+Yt
and Xi  Yi for all i ≤ t, then Xi  Yi for all i ≤ t as well.
Suppose for reductio that A ∩U 6= ∅. So there is some G ∈ A ∩U.
Hence
G = ∑
i≤m
λi(Xi −Yi) = ∑
i≤k
δi(Bi − Ai),
where λi ≥ 0 and Xi  Yi for all i ≤ m; likewise δi ≥ 0, ∑i δi = 1, and
Ai ≻ Bi for all i ≤ k. So
λ1(X1 −Y1) + . . .+ λm(Xm −Ym) + δ1(A1 − B1) + . . .+ δk(Ak − Bk) = 0.
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Let
Xi =
〈
xi1, . . . , x
i
n
〉
.
Likewise for Yi, Ai, and Bi. Then the equality above gives us a system of n
homogenous linear equations with rational coefficients:
(x11 − y11)λ1 + . . .+ (xm1 − ym1 )λm + (a11 − b11)δ1 + . . .+ (ak1 − bk1)δk = 0,
...
(x1n − y1n)λ1 + . . .+ (xmn − ymn )λm + (a1n − b1n)δ1 + . . .+ (akn − bkn)δk = 0.
Since this system of equations has rational coefficients, it has a rational
solution if it has any solution, by Gauss’ method. So we can rewrite
λ1(X1 −Y1) + . . .+ λm(Xm −Ym) + δ1(A1 − B1) + . . .+ δk(Ak − Bk) = 0
as
α1
β1
(X1−Y1)+ . . .+ αm
βm
(Xm−Ym)+ φ1
ψ1
(A1− B1)+ . . .+ φk
ψk
(Ak− Bk) = 0.
Multiplying through and rearranging gives us
(α1β2 . . . βmψ1 . . .ψk)(X1 −Y1)
+ . . .+ (αmβ1 . . . βm−1ψ1 . . .ψk)(Xm −Ym)
+ (φ1ψ2 . . .ψkβ1 . . . βm)(A1 − B1)
+ . . .+ (φkψ1 . . .ψk−1β1 . . . βm)(Ak − Bk) = 0.
This in turn gives us
(α1β2 . . . βmψ1 . . .ψk)X1 + . . .+ (αmβ1 . . . βm−1ψ1 . . .ψk)Xm
+ (φ1ψ2 . . .ψkβ1 . . . βm)A1 + . . .+ (φkψ1 . . .ψk−1β1 . . . βm)Ak
= (α1β2 . . . βmψ1 . . .ψk)Y1 + . . .+ (αmβ1 . . . βm−1ψ1 . . .ψk)Ym
+ (φ1ψ2 . . .ψkβ1 . . . βm)B1 + . . .+ (φkψ1 . . .ψk−1β1 . . . βm)Bk.
But recall, Xi  Yi for all i ≤ m, and Ai  Bi for all i ≤ k. So by Isovalence
we must have Xi  Yi for all i ≤ m and Ai  Bi for all i ≤ k. But since
Ai ≻ Bi for all i ≤ k, we have A 6 Bi for all i ≤ k. Contradiction.
Therefore A ∩U = ∅.
Conversely, suppose that A ∩ U = ∅. Suppose for reductio that 
violates Isovalence. So there are X1, . . . ,Xt,Y1, . . . ,Yt ∈ F such that
X1 + . . .+ Xt = Y1 + . . .+Yt.
Xi  Yi for all i ≤ t, and Xj ≻ Yj for some j ≤ t. Assume without loss of
generality that Xi ≈ Yi for all i 6= j. Then
∑
i 6=j
Xi −Yi = Yj − Xj.
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Let
G = ∑
i 6=j
Xi −Yi = Yj − Xj.
Then G ∈ A ∩U. Contradiction.
Therefore  must satisfy Isovalence.
This establishes that A ∩ U = ∅ iff  satisfies Isovalence. Now we
will show that if  satisfies Non-Triviality and Non-Negativity, then
A ∩U = ∅ iff  is strongly representable.
Suppose that  satisfies Non-Triviality and Non-Negativity. So Ω ≻ ∅
and X  ∅ for all X ∈ F .
Now suppose that A ∩ U = ∅. Note that A is the closed, convex
polyhedral cone generated by the set {X − Y | X  Y}. Likewise, U
is the convex hull of {Y − X | X ≻ Y}—a closed and convex set. So
the hyperplane separation theorem of Kuhn and Tucker (1956, p. 50)
guarantees that there is a linear functional E that strictly separates A and
U in the sense that
E[G] ≥ 0 for all G ∈ A,
E[G∗] < 0 for all G∗ ∈ U.
Since Ω ≻ ∅, ∅−Ω = −Ω ∈ U. Hence E[−Ω] < 0, which is the case iff
E[Ω] > 0.
Since X  ∅ for all X ∈ F , X−∅ = X ∈ A. Hence E[X] ≥ 0.
Now let
p(X) =
E[X]
E[Ω]
for all X ∈ F . Obviously p satisfies Normalization and Non-negativity,
since
p(Ω) =
E[Ω]
E[Ω]
= 1
and
p(X) ≥ p(∅) iff E[X]
E[Ω]
≥ E[∅]
E[Ω]
iff E[X] ≥ 0.
Moreover, if X ∩Y = ∅, then X ∪Y = X+Y. So
p(X ∪Y) = E[X+Y]
E[Ω]
=
E[X]
E[Ω]
+
E[Y]
E[Ω]
= p(X) + p(Y).
So p satisfies Finite Additivity. Hence p is a probability function. And it
follows straightforwardly that p strongly agrees with :
X  Y ⇒ E[X−Y] ≥ 0
⇔ E[X] ≥ E[Y]
⇔ p(X) ≥ p(Y),
340 jason konek
and
X ≻ Y ⇒ E[Y− X] < 0
⇔ E[X] > E[Y]
⇔ p(X) > p(Y).
Conversely, suppose that  is strongly representable. So there is some
probability function p such that strongly agrees with  in the sense that
(i) X  Y ⇒ p(X) ≥ p(Y),
(ii) X ≻ Y ⇒ p(X) > p(Y).
Suppose for reductio that A ∩U 6= ∅. So there is some G ∈ A ∩U. Hence
G = ∑
i≤m
λi(Xi −Yi) = ∑
i≤k
δi(Bi − Ai),
where λi ≥ 0 and Xi  Yi for all i ≤ m; likewise, δi ≥ 0, ∑i δi = 1, and
Ai ≻ Bi for all i ≤ k. Let
Ep[V ] = ∑
wi∈Ω
p(wi)vi,
where Ω = {w1, . . . ,wn} and V =< v1, . . . , vn >. Once more let
Xi =
〈
xi1, . . . , x
i
n
〉
.
Likewise for Yi, Ai, and Bi. Then
Ep[G] = ∑
wi∈Ω
p(wi)

∑
j≤m
λj(x
j
i − yji)


= ∑
j≤m
λj

 ∑
wi∈Ω
p(wi)(x
j
i − yji)


= ∑
j≤m
λj(p(Xj)− p(Yj)).
Since Xj  Yj for all j ≤ m, p(Xj) ≥ p(Yj). Hence
Ep[G] ≥ 0.
But we also have
Ep[G] = ∑
wi∈Ω
p(wi)

∑
j≤k
λj(b
j
i − aji)


= ∑
j≤k
λj

 ∑
wi∈Ω
p(wi)(b
j
i − aji)


= ∑
j≤k
λj(p(Bj)− p(Aj)).
comparative probabilities 341
Since Aj ≻ Bj for all j ≤ k, p(Aj) > p(Bj). Hence
Ep[G] < 0.
Contradiction. Therefore A ∩U = ∅.
So far we have established that A ∩U = ∅ iff  satisfies Isovalence.
Moreover, we have established that if  satisfies Non-Triviality and Non-
Negativity, then A ∩U = ∅ iff  is strongly representable. This suffices
to prove GST. 
Theorem 2 Suppose that  is IP-representable and satisfies Belief-Preference
Coherence. Let C be the maximal set of probability functions C that fully agrees
with . Let EC = {Ec | c ∈ C}. This C encodes your fair buying prices in the
sense that
EC [G] = inf
{
Ec[G] | c ∈ C
}
is equal to your fair buying price for G, B(G), when B(G) is defined, and is
undefined when it is not.
Proof. Suppose that  is IP-representable. So there is a set of probability
functions that fully agrees with it. Let C be the maximal set of probability
functions C that fully agrees with . So
X  Y ⇔ c(X) ≥ c(Y) for all c ∈ C.
And if C∗ fully agrees with , then C∗ ⊆ C.
First, note that C must be the set B of all probability functions b that
almost agree with :
B = {b | X  Y ⇒ b(X) ≥ b(Y)} .
Obviously C ⊆ B. To see that B ⊆ C, choose b ∈ B. Suppose for reductio
that b 6∈ C.
Case 1. For all X,Y ∈ F , if c(X) ≥ c(Y) for all c ∈ C, then b(X) ≥
b(Y). In that case, C∗ = C ∪ {b} fully agrees with . But then C is
not maximal. Contradiction.
Case 2. For some X,Y ∈ F , c(X) ≥ c(Y) for all c ∈ C, but b(X) <
b(Y). In that case, since C fully agrees with , X  Y. But since b
almost agrees with , this implies b(X) ≥ b(Y). Contradiction.
Hence B = C.
Second, note that since  is IP-representable,  satisfies Non-Triviality
and Non-Negativity. That is, Ω ≻ ∅ and X  ∅ for all X ∈ F .
Now suppose that  also satisfies Belief-Preference Coherence. So the
set A of gambles that our agent finds almost desirable (i.e., that she weakly
342 jason konek
prefers to the status quo) is exactly the set A of gambles that are almost
desirable relative to :
A = A =
{
∑
i
λi(Xi −Yi) | λi ≥ 0 and Xi  Yi
}
.
Our agent’s fair buying price for a gamble G is
B(G) = sup {a | G − a ∈ A} .
Our aim is to show that EC [G] = B(G) if B(G) is defined, and undefined
if not. We will start by first showing that A = A∗ where
A∗ = {G | Ec[G] ≥ 0 for all c ∈ C} .
Suppose that G ∈ A. So
G = ∑
i≤m
λi(Xi −Yi),
where λi ≥ 0 and Xi  Yi for all i ≤ m. Again let
Xi =
〈
xi1, . . . , x
i
n
〉
.
Likewise for Yi. Choose c ∈ C. Then
Ec[G] = ∑
wi∈Ω
c(wi)

∑
j≤m
λj(x
j
i − yji)


= ∑
j≤m
λj

 ∑
wi∈Ω
c(wi)(x
j
i − yji)


= ∑
j≤m
λj(c(Xj)− c(Yj)).
Since Xj  Yj for all j ≤ m, c(Xj) ≥ c(Yj). So
Ec[G] ≥ 0.
Therefore Ec[G] ≥ 0 for all c ∈ C. So G ∈ A∗.
Now suppose that G ∈ A∗. Suppose for reductio that G 6∈ A.
Note that A (= A) is the closed, convex polyhedral cone generated by
the set {X−Y | X  Y}. So the hyperplane separation theorem of Kuhn
and Tucker (1956, p. 50) guarantees that there is a linear functional E that
strictly separates this point G 6∈ A from A in the sense that
E[V ] ≥ 0 for all V ∈ A,
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but
E[G] < 0.
The proof of Theorem 1 shows how to use E to construct a probability
function b that almost (indeed, strongly) agrees with . And b is such that
Eb[V ] = ∑
wi∈Ω
b(wi)vi = ∑
wi∈Ω
E(wi)
E(Ω)
vi =
E[V ]
E(Ω)
for any gamble V . So Ec[V ] ≥ 0 iff E[V ] ≥ 0. In particular, then, since
E[G] < 0, Eb[G] < 0 as well.
But since b almost agrees with , b ∈ B = C. Since Eb[G] < 0, G 6∈ A∗.
Contradiction.
This establishes that A = A∗. Now we will show that EC [G] = B(G) if
B(G) is defined, and undefined if not.
EC [G] = inf
{
Ec[G] | c ∈ C
}
= sup
{
a | Ec[G] ≥ a for all c ∈ C
}
= sup
{
a | Ec[G − a] ≥ 0 for all c ∈ C
}
= sup
{
a | G − a ∈ A∗}
= sup
{
a | G − a ∈ A}
= B(G).

Theorem 3 A relation  strongly agrees with a real-valued function c if and
only if  satisfies weak transitivity:
Weak Transitivity. If X  Y1  . . .  Yn  Z, then X 6≺ Z.
Proof. The left-to-right direction is trivial. So suppose that  satisfies weak
transitivity. For any X ∈ F , let
ΦX = {X} ∪
{
Z | X  Y1  . . .  Yn  Z for some Y1  . . .  Yn ∈ F
}
.
Let c : F → R be defined by
c(X) = |ΦX|.
We must show:
(i) A  B⇒ c(A) ≥ c(B),
(ii) A ≻ B⇒ c(A) > c(B).
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Assume that A  B. Choose Z ∈ ΦB. Either Z = B or
B  Y1  . . .  Yn  Z
for some Y1  . . .  Yn ∈ F . So either
A  Z
or
A  B  Y1  . . .  Yn  Z.
Either way, Z ∈ ΦA. Hence ΦB ⊆ ΦA. As a result
c(A) = |ΦA| ≥ |ΦB| = c(B).
Now suppose that A ≻ B. As before, ΦB ⊆ ΦA. But now note that while
A ∈ ΦA, A 6∈ ΦB.
To see this, suppose for reductio that A ∈ ΦB. Then either A = B or
B  Y1  . . .  Yn  A
for some Y1  . . .  Yn ∈ F . If A = B, then A ≻ A, i.e., A  A but A 6 A.
Contradiction. If B  Y1  . . .  Yn  A, then by weak transitivity, B 6≺ A.
Contradiction.
So A ∈ ΦA but A 6∈ ΦB. Hence ΦB ⊂ ΦA. As a result
c(A) = |ΦA| > |ΦB| = c(B).

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